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SANCTIONS, SYMMETRY, AND SAFE
HARBORS: LIMITING MISAPPLICATION
OF RULE 11 BY HARMONIZING IT
WITH PRE-VERDICT DISMISSAL
DEVICES
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL *
INTRODUCTION

Ji[TH only a small risk of overstatement, one could say that sanctions in civil litigation exploded during the 1980s, with the 1983
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 acting as the principal
catalyst. From 1938 until the 1983 amendment, only two dozen or so
cases on Rule 11 were reported, with courts rarely imposing sanctions.'
Although a few cases were notable by virtue of sanction size, prestige of
the firm sanctioned, or publicity attending the underlying case,2 the legal
profession largely regarded Rule 11 as a dead letter.3 In addition, other
sanctions provisions, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 (regarding discovery) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) (regarding summary judgment affidavits made in bad faith), were seldom used or of
great consequence.4 The statute authorizing imposition of counsel fees
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Special thanks to Stephen Burbank,
George Cochran, Greg Joseph, Alan Morrison, Morton Stavis, Georgene Vairo, the
Brooklyn Law School faculty, the Committee on Federal Courts of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, and the American Bar Association Litigation Section Committee on Rule 11 for ideas, information, and comments on this issue. Thanks also to
Matthew Lepore and Ana-Maria Galeano for research assistance. This project was supported by a Brooklyn Law School summer research stipend.
1. See G. Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law Perspectives and Preventive Measures § 2.02[b], at 31-40 (1990); S. Kassin, An Empirical Study Of Rule 11 Sanctions 2
(Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1985). The precise extent of old Rule I l's limited reach is difficult to state
with precision. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (West 1991) (counting annotations shows 20 reported Rule 11 decisions, four imposing sanctions); Risinger, Honesty
in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 34-37 (1976) (attributing disuse of Rule to its structure
and language, 19 reported Rule 11 cases between 1938 and 1976, three imposing
sanctions).
2. See, e.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 704 F.2d 652, 660-61 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming
district court award of more than $50,000 against prestigious Boston law firm of Hale &
Dorr for continuing defamation suit without colorable claims against Barron's magazine
and its publisher, Alan Abelson, for statements made in Abelson's well-known "Walk
Down Wall Street" column).
3. See, e.g., Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 1-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 182-83 (1985) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Sanctions] (new Rule 11 seeks to
correct toothlessness of old Rule 11); Risinger, supra note I, at 34-37 (old Rule 11 ineffective as deterrent to frivolous litigation).
4. But see National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639, 643 (1976) (dismissal of complaint as sanction for repeated failure to comply with
discovery orders). Although National Hockey League briefly brought Rule 37 sanctions
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upon lawyers who unreasonably protract court proceedings, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927,' was employed even less often.6

As almost every attorney knows, things changed radically with the
1983 amendment to Rule 11. "New" Rule 11 resulted in approximately
700 reported Rule 11 opinions in just four and a half years, a tremendous
increase from the previous 43 years.7 Suddenly, sanctions were the rage.
Section 1927 sanctions also saw an upsurge, often inappropriately, as
courts equated Section 1927, which requires intentional bad faith, with
new Rule 11, which does not.8 Ironically, however, Federal Rules of
greater attention, see Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger & Carr, An Up-Date on Rule 37 Sanctions After National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Clubs, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 145,
150-69 (1980), one survey found that "[a] decided majority of the [trial] judges reported
that they 'seldom' or 'almost never' award the costs of bringing or opposing a discoveryrelated motion." R. Ellington, A Study of Sanctions for Discovery Abuse 8 (1979); see
also Section of Litigation, American Bar Association, Sanctions: Rule 11 and Other
Powers (2d ed. 1988) (noting that Rule 37 seldom used despite upsurge in Rule 11 sanctions after 1983).
Rule 56(g) was used even less often. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g) (West
1991) (15 reported cases giving provision serious discussion; five cases imposing sanctions
for affidavits made in bad faith); Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
F. Supp. 362, 380-81 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (Rule 56(g) expenses denied although court suggests challenged affidavit fell below standards of acceptability), aff'd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988) reads: "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States... who so multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."
Some of the disuse of § 1927 is understandable. Until 1980, the statute spoke only of
"costs" and was interpreted to permit recovery only of costs within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1920, which the prevailing party could obtain as a matter of course under the
latter statute. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759-60 (1980).
6. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West 1991) (listing 19 cases applying sanctions against
counsel under § 1927 from its inception through 1982); C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane,
Federal Practice and Civil Procedure § 2670 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter Wright & Miller].
7. See G. Vairo, supra note 1, § 2.02[b], at 31-33 (1990). The study counted reported decisions in the period between August 1, 1983 and December 15, 1987. A computer data base search yields a figure of approximately 3,000 Rule 11 cases. Search of
LEXIS, Genfed Library, US File (Oct. 11, 1991). See also T. Willging & E. Wiggins,
Rule 11: Survey of Federal District Court Judges; Study of Rule 11 Cases in Five Federal
District Courts; Review of Published District and Appellate Court Opinions Pt. IB, at 2
(1991) (more than 800 published Rule 11 cases in district court during 1984-1989 period),
Pt. ID, at I (approximately 350 published court of appeals opinions deciding Rule 11
issues during 1984-1989 period).
8. See, e.g., Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 1991) (Section 1927
requires finding of subjective bad faith by attorney as prerequisite to sanction); Kiefel v.
Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1968) (assessment of costs on
attorney guilty of misconduct only in instances of "serious and studied disregard for the
orderly process of Justice"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969). Despite this clearly established law, trial courts confuse the objective standard of Rule 11 and the subjective standard of § 1927 with disturbing frequency. See, e.g., Williams v. Giant Eagle Mkts., Inc.,
883 F.2d 1184, 1190-93 (3d Cir. 1989) (district court reversed for improperly applying
§ 1927 to losing party rather than counsel and for improperly finding bad faith due to
counsel pressing claim in face of strong defenses); Estate of Bias v. Winkler, 792 F.2d
858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986) (district court orders reversed for imposing § 1927 sanctions
under objective standard rather than actual bad faith standard).
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Civil Procedure 26(g) and 16(f), which Congress also strengthened in
1983, 9 saw relatively little use.'"
Because Rule 11 empowered courts to sanction any "paper" it found
to violate the Rule and because the complaint was the paper most frequently sanctioned," critics of new Rule 11 argued that it was manifestly
pro-defendant in impact, 12 disproportionately burdened some types of
claims more than others, 13 discouraged innovative lawyering,' 4 or had all
of these undesirable effects.'" Defenders of new Rule 11, on the other
hand, extolled the Rule or responded to the criticisms.' 6 Controversy

over Rule 11 remained heated enough to prompt the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules to issue a Call for Comments in July 1990. By
November 1990, more than 100 bar associations, judges, scholars, practitioners, and other interested parties had responded.' 7 In essence, judges
expressed support for Rule 11 while practitioners leveled strong criti9. See G. Vairo, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 4-5.
10. See Federal Courts Comm. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York,
Comments on FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11 and Related Rules, 46 The Rec. 267,

268-69 (1991) [hereinafter New York Bar Report] (only 85 LEXIS opinions citing Rule
26(g) and 153 opinions invoking Rule 16(f) during same period that saw more than 3,000
Rule 11 opinions).
11. See S. Burbank, Rule 11 In Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task
Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 at 110 (1989) [hereinafter Third Circuit
Task Force]; T. Willging, The Rule 11 Sanctioning Process 11 (1988); S. Kassin, An
Empirical Study Of Rule 11 Sanctions 28-29 (1985); Vairo, Rule 1): A CriticalAnalysis,
118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988).
12. See New York Bar Report, supra note 10, at 269 ("Rule 11 ... has become a
distinctly defendants' tool"); id. at 270-71 (citing Third Circuit Task Force, supra note

11, and T. Willging, supra note 11).
13. See Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,74

Cornell L. Rev. 270, 302-4 (1989) [hereinafter Tobias, PublicLaw]; Tobias, Rule 11 and
Civil Rights Litigation, 37 Buffalo L. Rev. 485, 502-05 (1989) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil
Rights]; see also Vairo, supra note 11, at 200-01 (noting tendency of Rule I1 to be applied
against civil rights plaintiffs and to discourage civil rights claims).
14. See, e.g., Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance:Re-

thinking Rule 11, 32 Vill. L. Rev. 575, 598-99 (1987) (absence of subjective good faith as
defense to sanctions motions makes lawyers less willing to try innovative arguments or to
bring cases where resolution of contested facts not preordained); Nelken, Sanctions Under
Amended FederalRule 11--Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compen-

sation and Punishment, 74 Geo. L.J. 1313, 1338-39 (1986) (same).
15. See, eg., Nelken, Has the ChancellorShot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a

Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 Hastings L.J. 383, 386-405 (1990) [hereinafter
Nelken, Chancellor](Rule I1 hypertrophy by much of bench and bar has produced more
problems of disparate impact and sideshow litigation than solutions to the problem of
frivolous claims); Burbank, The Transformationof American CivilProcedure: The Exam-

ple of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1932-33 (1989) (same).
16. See, e.g., Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1024-25 (1988)
[hereinafter Schwarzer, Revisited] (admitting problems and suggesting shift in judicial
analysis of Rule 11 motions but favoring retention of Rule 11 in current form);
Schwarzer, Sanctions,supra note 3, at 204-05 (generally praising Rule 11); see also Miller,
The New CertificationStandard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 503-06 (1990) (Advisory

Committee Reporter describes Rule 11 in neutral terms implying positive impact).
17. See Submissions to Advisory Comm. on the Civil Rules in Response to Call for
Comments on Rule 11 (copies on file with author).

HeinOnline -- 60 Fordham L. Rev. 259 1991-1992

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

cism. In February 1991, the Advisory Committee held a day of hearings
on Rule 11 and in May 1991 it issued a proposed revised Rule 11.18
One can understatedly describe the situation as in ferment and likely
to remain so as the Rule is revised, tested, criticized, perhaps revised
anew, and so on. Intelligent commentators have focused on Rule 11 and
the problem of deterring and punishing frivolous litigation while trying
to avoid chilling zealous advocacy and restricting access to the courts.
Several authors have worked especially hard to put the Rule in context
or to suggest general guidelines for application of the Rule.I9 However,
the sanctions debate is a distributional political battle that has some unavoidable aspects of a zero-sum game. If Rule 11 is written or interpreted
stringently, some claims are sacrificed in the name of efficiency, deterring
the unfounded or abusive, and thinning court dockets. If Rule I l's text
or application is made more forgiving, some of these values are sacrificed
in favor of zealous advocacy, innovative lawyering, and claimants'
18. As of this writing, a draft of new Rule 11 has been approved by the full Standing
Committee on The Federal Rules. A period for public comment runs until February 1,
1992, with a public hearing scheduled for November 21, 1991 in Los Angeles. The
Standing Committee will review the comments and determine either to make further revisions in the proposal, drop plans to change Rule 11, or submit the revised draft of Rule
11 to the Supreme Court. If the Court agrees with the Committee, it reports the new
Rule to Congress, which has 180 days to act. If Congress takes no action, the Rule is
enacted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 (1988). Although the Advisory Committee and
Standing Committee's determinations historically set the tone of Rules revision under the
Rules Enabling Act, the many steps in the process make apt the adage attributed to
baseball great Yogi Berra: "It ain't over 'til its over."
19. In addition to the works of Judge Schwarzer and Professors Nelken and Vairo
cited above, some particularly comprehensive efforts are the New York Bar Report, supra
note 10; ABA Section of Litigation, Standardsand Guidelinesfor Practice UnderRule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 121 F.R.D. 101 (1988) [hereinafter ABA Standards]; Note, A Genuine Ground in Summary Judgment for Rule 11, 99 Yale L.J. 411
(1989) [hereinafter Genuine Ground]; Note, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97
Yale L.J. 901 (1988); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing StandardsForRule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1987) [hereinafter Plausible Pleadings].
Except for Judge Schwarzer, who favors Rule 11 as written, see Schwarzer, Revisited,
supra note 16, at 1018, these authors all fit within what I define as the liberal/moderate
group of Rule 11 critics who nonetheless would not abolish the rule. Others are more
critical of the Rule. See, e.g., Cochran, Rule 11: The Road to Amendment, 7 Fifth Cir.
Rptr. 559, 560, 574 (1991) (notwithstanding title, author makes clear that he would prefer repeal of Rule 11); ABA Section of Litigation, Comments Submitted to the Advisory
Committee in Response to Call for Comments 3 (Oct. 29, 1990) (37% of members proposing repeal) (copies on file with author); J. Frank, Comments Submitted to the Advisory Committee in response to Call for Comments 1 (Oct. 30, 1990) (copies on file with
author) (proposing repeal); Solovy, The Cost ofRule 11, Compleat Law. (Spring 1990), at
26, 30 (same). At the November 1990 N.Y.U. Law School Conference on Rule 11, Prof.
Burbank succinctly stated the argument for repeal: "The good judges don't need it and
the bad judges misuse it."
Another group of perhaps greater size and importance has argued for retaining Rule 11
in current textual form. See Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 16, at 1018; M. Rosenberg,
Testimony before the Advisory Committee, in New Orleans (Feb. 21, 1991); A. Miller,
Comments at N.Y.U. Law School Conference on Rule 11 in New York City (Nov. 3,
1990).
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rights.2" Because some lawyers tend to favor the access/advocacy/innovation goals while others prefer the efficiency/expense/deterrence goals,
no theory of Rule 11 can hope to satisfy all sides of the sanctions debate
completely.
Nonetheless, Rule 11 practice, which even its supporters admit has
been plagued by inconsistency, can be made more even-handed, both on
its own terms and in relation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a
whole. This article proposes one structural approach to Rule 11 that has
largely been overlooked by commentators and courts." Simply put, it
proposes that courts expressly recognize a strong presumption that any
claim that has survived the pre-verdict stages of litigation be immune
from Rule 11 sanctions. This presumption can be overcome only by judicial findings, supported by the record, that the claimant has engaged in
fraud, misrepresentation, or other egregious misconduct. If properly applied, this approach can lead to appropriate judicial restraint in Rule 11
practice as well as increased equity between plaintiffs and defendants. In
particular, the approach reduces the potential adverse impact of Rule 11

in civil rights claims.
The suggested approach would create a presumptive safe harbor for
claimants, but not one that is so impregnable as to encourage or condone
abusive conduct by lawyers or litigants. The claimant would be permit-

ted to prosecute the action vigorously. Knowing that reflexive denials
will limit the court's ability to impose sanctions should encourage courts
to scrutinize pretrial motions under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 closely,
and should lessen the temptation to automatically deny directed verdict
20. See Louis, Interceptingand DiscouragingDoubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading,Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C.L. Rev. 1023, 1053-56 (1989) (acknowledging trade off
but arguing that status quo unwisely privileges access to courts over efficiency concerns).
Because ofjudicial focus on the complaint, Rule 11 has naturally affected plaintiffs most.
However, defendants, third-party defendants, and intervenors can be adversely affected
by Rule 11 to the extent that they are claimants.
21. Despite the myriad of Rule II commentary, no author has suggested this article's
approach of a presumptive safe harbor. Genuine Ground,supra note 19, comes closest by
suggesting the integration of the Rule 56 summary judgment test with the Rule II "well
grounded in fact" and "warranted by existing law" tests in order to prompt judges to
appreciate the potentially different inferences available when viewing a Rule 11 motion.
However, the author does not develop standards for determining when Rule 11 does
apply, although her general view accords with that of this article. The author writes,
"[slanctions, in addition to dismissal, should be imposed for unreasonable or dishonest
presentation of meritless claims" rather than unsuccessful claims. Genuine Ground,
supra note 19, at 414.
Courts, except for having correctly concluded that a claim is not sanctionable merely
because it is dismissed, have given even less thought to the relation of Rule 11 and dismissal devices. See, eg., Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 133 F.R.D. 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) ("denial of summary judgment in no way establishes that this suit had any basis in
fact. On the summary judgment motion, the court had before it only those facts and
allegations that the parties chose to present in their affidavits"). In the vast majority of
Rule 11 decisions involving cases that survived summary judgment, the courts make no
mention of any possible relationship.
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motions. Although this approach may result in more dismissals in close
cases, dismissals can be appealed and are less likely to undermine counsel's practice or pocketbook seriously. The presumptive safe harbor
would thereby reduce Rule l1's chilling effect found by so many.
Although this approach, like other attempts to bridge the gap separating
Rule 1l's fans and foes, will not bring universal satisfaction, it would
soften highly problematic aspects of the rule.
Part I of this article first briefly discusses the 1983 change to current
Rule 11 and the effect of Rule 11 in practice. Part I then outlines the
major pre-verdict disposition devices of Rule 12(b)(6), summary judgment, and directed verdict. I contend that claimants are doubly disadvantaged from the civil practice developments of the 1980s if courts do
not employ the presumptive safe harbor suggested by this article. Part II
outlines in greater detail the rationale, application, and impact of my
suggested approach and explains the particular advantages of this approach for civil rights2 3cases and fee shifting under both 42 U.S.C.
§ 198822 and Title VII.
I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE REFORM IN THE 1980s:
COUNTER-REVOLUTION

A.

A DECADE OF

The Establishment Strikes Back

New Rule 11 did not overtake civil practice overnight. Rather, it was
part of a general trend to limit the ease with which litigants could bring
and sustain claims. 24 Beginning in the 1970s, the profession was increas22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). This section provides for the award of reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party in claims brought under applicable civil rights
statutes.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988). This section provides for the award of reasonable attorney's fees at the discretion of the court to the prevailing party in an equal employment opportunity action.
24. See Louis, supra note 20, at 1033-37; Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 439-44 (1986) [hereinafter
Marcus]. The contraction of the class action device during the 1970s was perhaps the
start of the counter-revolution. See, eg., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
469-70 (1978) (eliminating "death knell" doctrine permitting interlocutory review of denials of class certification where this was effective end of litigation); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 177-79 (1974) (requiring class representatives to bear cost of
notifying class in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions seeking damages); Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292-300 (1973) (multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct
claims must each satisfy the minimum jurisdictional amount to sue in federal court);
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335-40 (1969) (limiting utility for plaintiffs and frequency
of use of class action device where jurisdiction founded on diversity by limiting aggregation of class member claims to satisfy jurisdictional amount); see also Tobias, Public Law,
supra note 13, at 287-96 (in response to the litigation explosion, courts, the Advisory
Committee, and Congress have attempted to discourage the filing of suits, to expedite the
resolution of suits and to punish abuses by attorneys). The contraction of the class action
device was criticized by Professor Miller, who later was principal drafter of Rule 11 and
largely an advocate of the 1980s reforms raising procedural barriers for claimants. See
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664, 678-79 (1979).
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ingly influenced by a growing perception that the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and subsequent interpretation had made it too easy to
state a claim that would survive a motion to dismiss.2 5 Professor Arthur
Miller, former Reporter for the Advisory Committee and the primary
drafter of new Rule 11, joined this chorus by characterizing the Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a legal claim as "last effectively used during the McKinley Administration." 26 Judicial reluctance
to grant summary judgment, or at least the perceived judicial hesitancy
occasioned by unfortunate rhetoric, 27 increased the perception that weak
claims were not being intercepted by pretrial motion. Directed verdict
motions also had limited utility since many judges, having allowed the
case to progress to trial, were inclined to obtain a jury verdict for reasons
of judicial administration unrelated to the merits.2" A corollary to this
view held that the ease of pleading and sustaining a claim allowed litigation to be used for blackmailing defendants into settlement.29 In addi25. See, e.g., Louis, supra note 20, at 1029-33 (judicial system too tolerant of weak or
frivolous claims, allowing too many poor claims to survive to trial and maintain settlement value); Miller, The Adversary System. Dinosauror Phoenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 1719 (1984) (costs of civil litigation, even for weak or frivolous claims, choke system's ability to adjudicate meritorious claims). These authors particularly criticized decisions giving broad construction to Fed. R Civ. P. 8(a) regarding what was necessary to state a
claim and the consequent reduction in the utility of Rule 12 motions as effective tools for
obtaining pretrial dismissal. See, eg., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-48 (1957) (complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
"unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts... entitl[ing] him
to relief); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (opinion by Judge
Charles Clark, principal drafter of the Federal Rules, reverses district court dismissal of
fragmented complaint failing to allege all elements of claim for conversion and becomes
influential), cited in Conley, 355 U.S at 46 n.5.
26. A. Miller, The August 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Promoting Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility 7-8 (1984); accord Miller, Litigation in America Today, 61 Wis. B. Bull. 9, 11 (Apr. 1988) (liberality of
federal civil rules has made dismissal difficult).
27. See, eg., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (reversing trial
court grant of summary judgment, writing that summary judgment must be denied when
"there is the slightest doubt as to the facts" (quoting earlier opinion in Doehler Metal
Furniture v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1945)). The ringing echo of the
"slightest doubt" test served both as a lightening rod for critics, see Wright & Miller,
supra note 6, § 2727, at 176-77, and as a superficial indication of absurd judicial reluctance to employ the summary judgment mechanism as intended by the drafters of the
Federal Rules. A more searching look at actual outcomes in lesser known cases, however, showed that courts frequently granted summary judgment, even in the supposedly
obstructionist Second Circuit. See Brachtl, Has Summary Judgment Been Eliminated in
the Second Circuit?, 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. 565, 566 (1980).
28. See D. Herr, R. Haydock & J. Stempel, Motion Practice § 21.2.3, at 606 (2d ed.
1991) [hereinafter Herr] (judge has little incentive to grant directed verdict as this necessitates retrial of case if reversed).
29. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)
(availability of discovery increases settlement value to claimant by "in terrorem" effect);
New Eng. Data Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 288 (1st Cir. 1987) (expressing fear
that without rigorous pleading burden "a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim will
bring a suit and conduct extensive discovery in the hopes of obtaining an increased settlement rather than in the hopes that the process will reveal relevant evidence"); Koastan-
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tion, the increase in court filings led to talk of a "litigation explosion." 3
By the 1980s, conservative reform sentiments had gathered sufficient
strength to cause rule changes,3 1 statutory changes, 32 and changes in judicial application of the existing Federal Rules.3 a One commentator has
referred to these developments as a "counter-revolution" against the notice pleading/open discovery revolution embodied in the 1938 rules.3 4 In
addition, the Advisory Committee proposed a more far-reaching revision
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to have this offer-of-judgment costshifting rule include counsel fees. However, Congress, in response to
tinakos v. FDIC, 719 F. Supp 35, 38 (D. Mass 1989) (stressing importance of strict
enforcement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) that requires fraud to be plead with particularity in
securities law claims because they have a high "strike suit value").
30. See, e.g., Tobias, Public Law, supra note 13, at 287-96 (discussing role of rules in
litigation explosion; Louis, supra note 20, at 1029 ("The procedural woes of our civil
justice system are easy enough to list. The federal courts are currently bursting with
cases, claims, and defenses, many of which are apparently not well founded.") (footnotes
omitted; no empirical support for assertion regarding volume of unmeritorious claims);
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
Rev. 4, 61-69 (1983) (observing trend claiming excessive litigation but disputing accuracy
of the perception); Bork, Dealing With the Overloadin Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231,
233 (1976) (former solicitor general and federal judge argues that courts are increasingly
used for "self-defeating effort to guarantee every minor right people think they ought
ideally to possess").
31. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 997-1001
(1980); see also id. at 1000 (1980) (Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting from
reporting of amended rules to Congress) (arguing that discovery revisions do not go far
enough to streamline litigation); Rosenberg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil
Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579, 579-83 (mentioning Supreme
Court's promulgation of amendments to the federal discovery rules in 1980).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 was amended in 1980 to permit a party victimized by an attorney's bad faith misconduct to recover both counsel fees and expenses resulting from the
misconduct.
33. Compare Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (rejecting defense
argument that Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requirement of pleading fraud with particularity imposes rigorous burden upon plaintiff and explaining that Rule 9(b) requires only that
defendant be able to "prepare an adequate answer" and "flesh out the allegations in the
complaint through discovery") with Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875,
878 (Ist Cir. 1991) (to satisfy Rule 9(b), plaintiff must "specify the time, place and content of an alleged false representation . . .[and] provide some factual support for the

allegations of fraud"). See also Marcus, supra note 24, at 445-50 (tracing trend away
from liberal notice pleading approach of Conley v. Gibson and toward increasingly rigorous burden of pleading facts, and noting this trend even where Rule 9(b) not applicable as
"antidote to pro-plaintiff biases" seen in 1938 Rules). But see Louis, supra note 20, at
1037-38 (antitrust and civil rights claims "are inherently vague and seem to generate an
abundance of complex, protracted, and ultimately unsuccessful litigation").
34. See Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on
the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 35, 35
(1988) [hereinafter Risinger, Counter-Revolution] (noting "emerging consensus that federal civil procedure is in the midst of a counterrevolution" but noting debate over nature
and impact of revision movement); accord Tobias, Public Law, supra note 13, at 287-96;
Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedureand Erie, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 3, 23-30 (1988); Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 31, 33-34 (1988).
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widespread criticism of the Proposed New Rule 68, principally from
legal scholars and public interest/civil rights lawyers, thwarted the attempt." The Zeitgeist of the counter-revolution gust so strongly that one
ordinarily insightful commentator stridently criticized these groups for
taking their case to Congress in the face of the Advisory Committee's
rejection of their well-taken concerns.3 6 In this reascendency of the
haves,3 7 where advocates of the disempowered were criticized for merely
participating in the process, the 1983 Rule 11 amendment was perhaps
the most important development.
B.

The 1983 Rule 11 Amendment

Prior to 1983, Rule 11 stated that the signature of an attorney was
required on judicial papers and that the signature constituted counsel's
certification that the paper was not brought in bad faith, to multiply proceedings, or to harass the opponent. 38 New Rule 11 retained the signature requirement and its status as a certification but dramatically
changed the substance of the provision.
New Rule 11 states that counsel's signature certifies that he has made
reasonable inquiry into the circumstances underlying the action and that
the paper is:
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
35. See Burbank, supra note 34, at 34. See generally Burbank, Proposal to Amend

Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 425 (1986) (providing background about criticisms and proposed amendments to the rule). The Rule 68 amendments were viewed by many as a threat to the bringing of civil rights claims because the
amendments could result in a de facto "English Rule," where the losing party reimbursed
the counsel fees of the prevailing party (in contrast to the "American Rule" in which
each litigant bears its own counsel fees and expenses) whenever the prevailing defendant
had the presence of mind to make an offer of judgment.
Notwithstanding congressional rejection, the Supreme Court achieved some of the
goals of the thwarted amended rule in Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (finding
counsel fees a "cost" within the meaning of Rule 68 because of substantive law, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, which authorizes fee shifting to prevailing plaintiffs); See id. at 7-12; see also
Christiansburg Garment v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1978) (prevailing civil rights
defendant may only recover counsel fees where plaintiff's claim is unfounded or frivolous); Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 334 (1st Cir. 1986) (Marek v. Chesney does
not change Christiansburg Garment; the losing civil rights or Title VII plaintiff need not
pay defense fees despite Rule 68 offer unless plaintiff's claim is frivolous), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1029 (1987).
36. See Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Poli-

tics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C.L. Rev. 795, 848-51 (1991).
37. See Risinger, Counter-Revolution, supra note 34, at 35. Some commentators
"view it [the counter-revolution] as a cynical movement to restore to defendants, particularly powerful, establishment 'repeat player' defendants, traditional procedural advantages they lost by virtue of the Federal Rules' emphasis on full disclosure and decision on
the merits," with Professor Risinger "tending toward this view". Id. at 35 & n.4. According to Professor Risinger, "[w]hatever the conscious motivation, it seems clear that
many of the burdens flowing from recent changes in the system have fallen more heavily
upon plaintiffs than defendants." Id, at 35 (footnote omitted).
38. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938).
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and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 39

New Rule 11 imposes an objective standard upon lawyers and clients.
Their assessment of the factual and legal merit of the court paper must be
justified by reference to the mythical average reasonable person' (or reasonable lawyer, if that is not an oxymoron). No longer could a lawyer
who erred argue that she intended no harm.4 1 "Simply put, subjective
good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did." 42 Put more
cynically, the "pure heart/empty head" defense to Rule 11 sanctions is
no longer available.4 3 In addition, where the court finds a Rule 11 violation, the court is required to impose a sanction, although it has discretion
as to the type of sanction and the amount of a monetary sanction."
Although counsel are not required to delineate with great specificity
whether they argue that a claim is warranted by existing law or by a law
reform argument, and although attorneys may not be sanctioned for an
arguable ethical violation that does not constitute the bringing of a frivolous complaint,4" most courts have found sanctions available where a
particular claim or group of claims is unsupported by fact or law even if
the paper as a whole has merit.4 6 Although courts remain divided over
39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 & 1987). The 1987 changes to Rule 11 were of a technical and nonsubstantive nature.
40. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
41. Old Rule 11 authorized sanctions only for "willful" violations. See Biggs v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 280 F.2d 311, 313 (3d Cir. 1960).
42. Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d 243 at 253.
43. See Schwarzer, Sanctions, supra note 3, at 186-87.
44. Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d at 254 n.7. However, judicial discretion is not
unbounded. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 584
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (on remand, district court awards $1,000 in counsel fees to defendant as
sanction for plaintiff's Rule I1 violation in bringing claim unwarranted by law); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding $1,000
award to be so low as to constitute abuse of discretion, imposing $10,000 in counsel fees
as sanction, viewing this as lowest permissible range of district court discretion). But see
Eastway Constr. Corp., 821 F.2d at 126 (Pratt, J., dissenting) (suggesting $10,000 inappropriately low sanction and suggesting that sanctions analysis begin with lodestar-attorney hours multiplied by reasonable hourly billing rate--of defense counsel, which
totaled more than $50,000).
45. See Golden Eagle Distrib. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1539-41 (9th Cir.
1986).
46. See, e.g., Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir.
1990) (en banc) (overruling Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202,
1205 (9th Cir. 1988)); Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1988)
(Rule 11 imposed against attorney who represented authors in copyright action that con-
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certain Rule 11 issues,47 many of the initial uncertainties or divisions
have been replaced by a consensus of application. 48 In addition, courts
appear to have moved toward limiting Rule 11 to the "least severe sanction" necessary to effectuate the purposes of the rule, with appellate
courts in many instances reversing or remanding very large sanctions
awards.49 Some commentators have also observed improved judicial sensitivity to the application of Rule 11 against civil rights claimants." °

Nonetheless, counsel and litigants, particularly civil rights claimants,
continue to find in Rule 11 a chilling impact on their claims. 5'

C. Sanctions Law as a Source of Asymmetry Between

Claimants and Defendants
Despite steps toward consensus over Rule Il 's application, contro-

versy remains, both because of remaining inconsistency 52 and because a
substantial segment of the profession finds current Rule 11 unpalatable
even if properly applied. In particular, Rule 11 has been disproportionately directed at complaints rather than other papers such as summary

judgment motions, discovery motions, motions to transfer or other papers routinely filed by defendants.53 Inevitably, this practice affects
plaintiffs more adversely than defendants. In addition, other Federal
tained frivolous claims). But see Burull v. First Nat'l Bank, 831 F.2d 788, 789-90 (8th
Cir. 1987) (where complaint is legally and factually substantial enough to reach a jury
and the inclusion of meritless claims has no appreciable effect on the litigation, Rule 11
sanctions are not required), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
47. Compare Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1436 (7th
Cir. 1987) (even a paper adequately supported by fact and law sanctionable if court finds
paper filed for improper purpose) with Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503,
1508 (9th Cir. 1987) (factually grounded, legally cognizable claim insulated from improper purpose sanctions).
48. See Herr, supra note 28, § 19.4.4, at 523-35; ABA Standards, supra note 19, at
124.
49. See, eg., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (adopting "the principle that the sanction imposed should be the least severe sanction adequate to the purpose of Rule 11"); Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395, 397-98 (7th Cir.
1987) (court reserves the right to impose whatever sanction it deems necessary to effectuate the purposes of rule 11); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (violation
of Rule 11 does not automatically entitle plaintiff to attorney's fees, the district court
retains right to award least severe sanction appropriate).
50. See, e.g., Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibratedin Civil Rights Cases, 36 Vill. L. Rev. 105,

110-16 (1991) [hereinafter Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated] ("panels in more than half of
the federal circuits enforced [Rule 11] in ways that were solicitous of the needs of civil
rights plaintiffs").
51. See New York Bar Report, supra note 10, at 270-71.

52. See Genuine Ground,supra note 19, at 418-25 (describing judicial inconsistency of
Rule 11 results and rationales and "enduring confusion surrounding Rule 11").
53. See T. Willging & E. Wiggins, supra note 7, Pt. 1B, at 13. In the five judicial
districts studied, the complaint was the subject of the Rule I1 sanctions in more than half
the cases where sanctions were imposed. In reported cases, the complaint was the object
of the sanction in more than 58 percent of cases. The next most frequent object of sanctions was the ubiquitous "Other" category at 15 percent. See id. Pt. 3, at 6; see also New
York Bar Report, supra note 10, at 269-71 (summarizing other studies with similar data).

HeinOnline -- 60 Fordham L. Rev. 267 1991-1992

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

Rules such as 16(f), 26(g), 37, and 56(g), which could perhaps place
equivalent or greater burdens on defendants, remain virtual dead letters.5 4 There also remains the disturbing although incomplete statistical
picture that suggests that civil rights and discrimination claims are more
frequently subjected to Rule 11 sanctions. 5 In addition, claims have
progressed to trial or jury verdict only to be sanctioned, sometimes with
at least partial appellate affirmance.5 6 This last problem, although
eclipsed by the higher decibel debate over Rule 11 generally, is significant,5 7 illustrative of judicial error, and unnecessary in view of the law of
pre-trial case disposition.
D. Pre-Verdict Disposition
1. Rule 12(b)(6)

Although comments about the limited utility of Rule 12(b)(6) contain
a substantial element of truth, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim continues to hold significance in civil litigation. With the filing of a
complaint, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 provides defense counsel

with several options, including motions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction,5" for absence of personal jurisdiction,59 for improper
54. This disparity lead the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to recommend an omnibus sanctions rule for abusive conduct in the hope that this would focus
judges upon all forms of frivolous litigation, not only the making of weak or unsubstantiated claims. See New York Bar Report, supra note 10, at 299-302.
55. See T. Willging & E. Wiggins, supra note 7, Pt. IC, at 2-3; G. Vairo, supra note 1,
§ 2.02[b], at 35-37; Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 11, at 68-72; New York Bar
Report, supra note 10, at 270; Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 13, at 490-92. But see T.
Willging & E. Wiggins, supra note 7, Pt. 2 (summaries of cases where sanctions imposed
in five district courts suggest that many of the sanctioned civil rights claims were frivolous and involved inadequate preparation concerning procedure and other legal questions
rather than substantive interpretation of civil rights statutes).
56. See, e.g., Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1222, 1392-93 (E.D.N.C. 1987)
(plaintiffs and counsel assessed more than $80,000 in sanctions after seven years of litigation and multi-week trial), aff'd in part sub nom. Blue v. United States Dep't of the
Army, 914 F.2d 525, 551 (4th Cir. 1990) (sanctions substantially reduced in amount),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991); Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp.
421, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (plaintiffs and counsel assessed $30,000 in sanctions after
unsuccessful trial of age and ethnic discrimination claims).
57. Although there initially appear to be relatively few reported cases revealing imposition of Rule 11 sanctions after denial of summary judgment or other pre-verdict disposition motions, the problem is not rare. See T. Willging, supra note 11, at 77. In a random
sample of 60 cases, sanctions were imposed after trial or settlement in more than onethird of the cases. See id. Where such sanctioning occurs based on a deferred decision
regarding earlier conduct offending Rule 11, this may not run counter to this article's
proposed approach. In addition, where the case survived until trial due to a claimant's
misconduct, this article's approach authorizes sanctions. Nonetheless, the one-third figure of this sample suggests that failure to harmonize Rule 11 practice with pre-verdict
disposition practice presents a significant problem despite its having been overshadowed
by the larger debate over Rule 11.
58. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
59. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
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venue,' for defective process, 61 for inadequate service of the complaint 62
and, most important, for failure to state a claim (Federal Rule 12(b)(6)).
Although this article focuses on the relation between Rule 12(b)(6)
and Rule 11, the same considerations will often apply in cases where
defendant has made a motion to dismiss because of alleged jurisdiction or
venue defects. In all of these situations, the possibility exists that the
court may deny the defense motion and later come to believe that the
complaint or some aspect of it was not supported by subject matter jurisdiction, that the court had no personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
that venue was improper, or that the claim was not one entitled to legal
relief. Where the court's change of heart is so great that it views the
claim as unsupported in fact or unwarranted by law within the meaning
of Rule 11, the potential arises for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
well after the court's first opportunity to have disposed of the case.
I argue in Part II(A), below,6 3 that trial courts should generally resist
such "eleventh hour" sanctions unless the claimant avoided Rule 12 dismissal through fraud, misrepresentation, or similarly egregious misconduct. Rule 12(b)(6) cases are generally more likely to present this
situation than the jurisdiction/venue motions of Rule 12(b)(l)-(3). The
latter group of motions may, and often does, involve submission of facts
by affidavit or otherwise, with lengthier, more focused oral arguments or
hearings." Unless the judge is misled by the claimant, she is likely to
decide the jurisdiction or venue motion correctly and consistently. By
contrast, hornbook law states-indeed requires-that the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion accept as true all of the factual allegations of the complaint for
purposes of ruling on the motion.6" Courts have traditionally departed
from this principle in only the most outlandish cases." The Rule
12(b)(6) motion thus tests only the legal strength of plaintiff's claims,
60. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
61. See Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(4). "This motion attacks the adequacy of the content of

the summons." Herr, supra note 28, § 9.2.1, at 191. Because plaintiffs are given a preprinted summons by the Clerk of the Court upon the filing of the complaint, the content
of the summons can be defective only from typographical errors and the motion is rare.
It is nearly as rare in state court, where attorneys have the basic summons language on
word processor files or preprinted forms.

62. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). This motion attacks the adequacy of the delivery of
the summons and complaint rather than the content of the summons. See Herr, supra
note 28, § 9.2.1, at 191.
63. See infra notes 115-44 and accompanying text.
64. See Herr, supra note 28, §§ 10.1, 10.2, 11.3; Wright & Miller, supra note 6,
§§ 1350, 1351, 1352.
65. See Herr, supra note 28, §§ 9.5.1, 9.5.2; Wright & Miller, supra note 6, §§ 1357,
1363. However, the court is not, of course, required to accept the legal conclusions al-

leged by a claimant.

66. See F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 5.19 (3d ed. 1985); James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-ControlDevices Available Before Verdict, 47 Va. L. Rev.
218, 218-27 (1961). Court deference to pleading may be changing in practice without
benefit of judicial acknowledgment. See Marcus, supra note 24, at 436.
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assuming a "best case scenario" of the facts of the dispute. 67 As a result,
courts "have historically disfavored the Rule 12(b)(6) motion" and have

refused to grant it where "there is room for doubt.

'68

Although it is not

waived if defendant fails to raise the issue in the first response to the

complaint, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is ordinarily made early in the

litigation.69
Even though a claim has survied a 12(b)(6) motion, the confluence of
these factors makes it possible that a court will come to view the claim as
insufficiently grounded in fact and that the claimant's attorney failed to

conduct a reasonable inquiry within the meaning of Rule 11. However,
notwithstanding its comparative rarity, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion has
considerable utility where the defense makes a legal attack on the pleadings,7 ° and correlates quite well with the "warranted by law" and law
reform7 1 prongs of the Rule 11 certification. Presumably, a court will
more likely grant the "pure law" Rule 12(b)(6) motion and will less frequently change its view in such cases than in cases where the plaintiff's
alleged facts differ markedly from defendant's version of events. In
short, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, despite its bad press in recent years,72
may be both eminently grantable and quite relevant to a subsequent Rule
11 inquiry. Where a court has denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on
its legal analysis rather than on fictional fact pleading by the defendant,
the claim must presumably be one either warranted by existing law or
supported by a colorable law reform argument.
2.

Rule 56: Summary Judgment

Modern summary judgment doctrine possesses much of what the Rule
67. See Herr, supra note 28, § 9.6.2.
68. Id. § 9.6.1, at 220. In practice, the plaintiff has usually received "the benefit of
most legal doubts as well" as factual inferences. Id. § 9.6.2, at 221; accord Wright &
Miller, supra note 6, § 1357, at 321-37. The factors and judicial treatment surrounding
Rule 12(b)(6) are essentially duplicated with Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the
pleadings. See id. § 1367; Herr, supra note 28, § 9.6.3.
69. See Herr, supra note 28, § 9.6.1; Wright & Miller, supra note 6, § 1357, at 300-01.
70. See Herr, supra note 28, § 9.6.2, at 222.
71. By "law reform" prong, I mean the portion of Rule 11 that exempts from sanction a paper's contents that make a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law. Because the Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal (rather
than factual) soundness of a pleading, denial of the motion should trigger the "safe harbor" presumption outlined in Part II of this article if there should occur an application
for Rule 11 sanctions based on either the "warranted by law" or "law reform" prongs of
Rule 11. Because the pleading was not dismissed, it can not be legally frivolous absent
subjective bad faith of the pleader in making a law reform argument. Denial of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, however, should have no similar presumptive effect upon a later Rule 11
motion alleging that the pleading was not well grounded in fact or was interposed for an
improper purpose, because these are fact-based arguments that are not adjudicated during the process of the legal analysis that attends a 12(b)(6) motion.
72. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (Court suggests failure of Rule 12(b)(6) to meet expectations as device for eliminating claims unworthy of
trial); supra note 26 and accompanying text (suggesting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
almost impossible).
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12(b)(6) motion lacks in ability to resolve fact-based disputes prior to
trial. In 1986, the Supreme Court issued three major decisions designed
to strengthen the motion and to increase summary judgment. In Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett,7 3 the Court clarified a number of seemingly technical but
substantively important points regarding the burden of production facing
both movants and non-movants. Celotex stated that summary judgment
movants need not invariably accompany the motion with affidavits: outlining a claimant's failure to produce evidence by reference to the record
of the case could in many cases be sufficient, so long as the defendant was
doing something more than making "a conclusory assertion that the
plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case." 74 In response to a properly
made summary judgment motion, a claimant must do more than merely
allege favorable facts or express a vague hope that discovery will produce
evidence in its favor. Rather, the non-movant must either bring forth
admissible evidence or conduct discovery it believes will lead to information making summary judgment inappropriate, and the court must give
claimants adequate time and opportunity for that discovery."'
The tone of the Celotex opinion was as important as its holding. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist praised summary judgment
in a manner that could not have been lost on trial courts, stating:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules
as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' Before the shift to 'notice plead-

ing' accomplished by the Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a
complaint or to strike a defense were the principal tools by which factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented
from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of
public and private resources. But with the advent of 'notice pleading,'
the motion to dismiss seldom fualfills this function any more, and its
place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56
must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons
asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of
persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses
have no factual basis.7 6
73. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
74. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J.,
concurring). Justice White's concurrence was
the key vote in Celotex, a 5-4 decision regarding the merits of the specific defense summary judgment motion and plaintiff's response.
75. See id. at 326.

76. Id. at 327 (citation omitted). Parenthetically, I must note my disagreement with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's implicit suggestion that notice pleading is the villain that emasculated Rule 12. It is not the generality of pleading under Rule 8(a) that makes it difficult
to grant a motion to dismiss. Judicial reluctance to grant Rule 12(b)(6) motions stems
from the historical common law requirement, applied to Rule 12, that the court must
accept the claimant's allegations as true and refrain from scrutinizing evidence. Even the
most rigorous code pleading requirements would not prevent a lawyer who was willing to
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Earlier the same year, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., the Court held that summary judgment could be granted
in a complex antitrust case even where the non-movant had presented
expert witness affidavits in support of its inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence of a predatory pricing conspiracy. Despite the expert

testimony, the Court reversed the Third Circuit's denial of summary
judgment because the Court found plaintiff's theory of the case "implau-

sible" according to existing neoclassical economic theory, particularly
the Chicago School of antitrust analysis. 8 Under such circumstances,
the Court suggested that only direct evidence of the alleged predatory
pricing conspiracy would suffice to defeat summary judgment. 9
Because Matsushita was heavily influenced by the new substantive law
of predatory pricing and economic theory, 0 it remains unclear how

much the Matsushita approach has affected summary judgment in other
classes of cases," or even inantitrust cases not involving predatory pricing.8" For example, the Matsushita approach has not been as aggresplead any fact from avoiding dismissal. Such requirements would, however, prevent
many honest lawyers from pleading with specificity in cases where they can not obtain
specific information without the benefit of discovery.
77. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
78. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 591-93, 596-97.
79. See id. at 597-98.
80. See Stempel, A DistortedMirror: The Supreme Court'sShimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 95, 111
(1988). "In the main, Matsushita seems more an opinion restricting the use of antitrust
claims than an opinion on summary judgment. Summary judgment was merely the vehicle by which the Court rid the judicial system of an antitrust claim disfavored by five of
the Court's members." Id.
81. See, eg., Major Computer, Inc. v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1249, 1252
(8th Cir. 1991) (reversing summary judgment in claim of tortious interference with contract); Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901, 905-07 (2d Cir. 1991) (summary judgment reversed in product liability claim); Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1478-81 (9th
Cir. 1991) (summary judgment reversed in securities fraud case); Association of Am.
Medical Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1991) (summary judgment
reversed in copyright case focusing on claim of federal copyright law pre-emption of state
law requiring disclosure by testing company); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (summary judgment reversed
in patent case); Williams v. Wright, 927 F.2d 1540, 1550-51 (11 th Cir. 1991) (summary
judgment reversed in ERISA case).
In all of these cases, the courts found no rules of substantive law that limited the
inferences that a jury might draw from facts in dispute. Consequently, facts subject to
different interpretation at trial required denial of summary judgment. By contrast, the
Matsushita court established a rule of antitrust law holding that allegations of long-term
predatory pricing conspiracies are so "implausible" that plaintiff was required to submit
more than mere circumstantial evidence in order to go to trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 595-98.
82. See, eg., Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tel., 931 F.2d 655, 665 (10th Cir. 1991) (reversing
district court grant of summary judgment in antitrust case); Tunis Bros. v. Ford Motor
Co., 823 F.2d 49, 50-51 (3d Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060 (1988); Apex
Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
977. But see Bhan v. NME Hosp., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Matsushita
significantly clarified the standards for resolving summary judgment cases in the antitrust
arena.").
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sively employed in civil rights claims that assert improper concerted
activity by defendants.8 3 Because the substantive law of job discrimination recognizes the often indirect nature of the proofs," Matsushita appears to have had less impact outside antitrust. 85
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,86 the Court suggested greater generalized support for trial court grants of summary judgment, stating that a

trial court may grant summary judgment even where the non-movant has
submitted evidence in conflict with that of the movant's as long as the

evidence is one-sided or only "colorable.

'8 7

Liberty Lobby stated that in

ruling on summary judgment motions, trial courts were to make the

same inquiry undertaken in deciding directed verdict motions: "whether
a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence

presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence from which
the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."8 8
However, courts will not always find cognizable the inferences that

discrimination plaintiffs urge on the basis of statistical disparity or other

circumstantial evidence.8 9 A claim violative of the fact prong of Rule 11
should never survive a defendant's summary judgment motion absent
fraud or like circumstances.
E. Developments in Pre-Verdict Disposition and Sanctions Law
Combining in Favor of Defendants
Where courts, absent applicability of the fraud exception, impose sanctions after trial, or even after summary judgment, the court's imposition
83. See Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 689-90 (7th Cir. 1990) (sustaining
pretrial dismissal of claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 but reversing Rule 11
sanctions, noting that conspiracies are by their nature very difficult to prove and dependent on facts largely within control of defendants, requiring resort to evidence based on
circumstantial evidence).
84. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
85. See, eg., Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533-34 (2d Cir. 1991) (circumstantial evidence held to create triable issue of anti-semitism in discharge of Drug Enforcement Agency trainee and whether purported reason for discharge was pretextual); Ting v.
United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1510 (9th Cir. 1991) (arrestee had amnesia but indirect
medical evidence of manner of shooting held to create triable issue notwithstanding direct
testimony of admittedly self-interested federal arresting agents).
However, courts will not always find cognizable the inferences discrimination plaintiffs
urge on the basis of statistical disparity or other circumstantial evidence. See, eg., Larry
v. White, 929 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 1991) (disparity among schools in passing Texas
dental examination insufficient proof of race discrimination to merit trial of fourteenth
amendment claim).
86. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
87. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
88. Id. at 252.
89. See Genuine Ground,supra note 19, at 420-24; see, e.g., Larry v. White, 929 F.2d
206, 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1991) (disparity among schools in test passage rates of black and
white graduates; claims surviving summary judgment must therefore also satisfy Rule
11).
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of sanctions looks uncomfortably like ad hoc imposition of the English
Rule of fee shifting and presents serious equitable concerns. Judges who
deny dismissal but later impose sanctions play a judicial version of the
discredited merchant's practice of "bait-and-switch": claimants are permitted, even encouraged, to pursue a claim, but then are required to pay
defendant's subsequently accumulated, sizeable counsel fees should they
lose badly enough to prompt the court to view the case as weak. The
potential abuse is heightened in situations where the claimant or its counsel develops a strained relationship with the judge during the course of

trial.
Judicial decisions have touched upon the relation of Rule 11 and dismissal devices but have given few definitive pronouncements. 90 For example, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the relation but stopped short of
a general presumption against sanctions for claims surviving dismissal.
In Sullivan v. School Board of Pinellas County,9 the court stated that
90. Cf Genuine Ground, supra note 19, at 424 ("Many judges do not see a link between Rule 11 and summary judgment."). A few courts have at least touched on the
relationship between pretrial dismissal and sanctions. For example, in Sullivan v. School
Rd. of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182 (11 th Cir. 1985), the court noted that "cases where
findings of 'frivolity' have been sustained typically have been decided in the defendant's
favor on a motion for summary judgment or a Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) motion for involuntary dismissal" and that "[i]n cases where the plaintiffs introduced evidence sufficient to
support their claims, findings of frivolity typically do not stand." Sullivan, 773 F.2d at
1189.
However, the Sullivan court declined to adopt an explicit presumption against sanctions for claims that survive until trial and instead made absence of pretrial dismissal a
factor to consider in ruling on sanctions motion. The court lists as factors: "(1) whether
the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and
(3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on
the merits." Id. The Sullivan court reversed the trial judge's imposition of sanctions.
See id. at 1189-90. Other courts have also found survival to trial a factor to consider but
have stopped short of creating a presumption against sanctions. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v.
Kimbrough Inv. Co., 703 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir. 1983) (sanctions denied due to existence
of prima facie case and defendant's attempt to settle); Jones v. Texas Tech Univ., 656
F.2d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (careful consideration given to case by district court and
the full-blown trial on merits were factors militating against imposition of sanctions).
More commonly, courts either fail to mention any possible relation between pretrial
dismissal and the strength of a claim, or in practice they find the absence of pretrial
disposition no serious restraint on the award of sanctions. For example, in Steinberg v.
St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court found plaintiffs'
suit "one of the most frivolous employment discrimination actions ever brought." Id. at
424. The court was confronted, however, with its own failure to grant defendant's summary judgment motion in a case that proceeded to trial. To this, the court responded:
The fact that [the case] survived a summary judgment motion merely indicates that at the time that motion was brought, though the case seemed very
weak, there did appear to be genuine issues of fact sufficient, under the stringent
standards of this circuit, to warrant denial of the motion. Indeed, the unfortunate irony of this case is that by giving the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt as
to the claims of proof that they made in their opposition to that motion, as the
Court was required to do, we are now confronted with the defendant's very
compelling application for attorney's fees.
Id. at 424. The Steinbergcourt awarded $30,000 in sanctions to defendant. See id. at 426.
91. 773 F.2d 1182 (1lth Cir. 1985).
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"[d]eterminations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case
basis," but observed that "[flactors considered important in determining
whether a claim is frivolous" include introduction of evidence by the
claimant and "whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or
held a full-blown trial on the merits." 92 Other federal courts have expressed clear reluctance to award Rule 11 sanctions or Section 1988 fees
where a claim has survived summary judgment.9 3 However, none have
made as strong a statement against Rule 11 sanctions after denial of summary judgment as did the Minnesota Supreme Court in Uselman v.
Uselman.94 Uselman involved a challenge to the administration of a family trust fund. The case spanned several years during which plaintiff's
claims survived several summary judgment motions. After a defense verdict at trial, plaintiff's counsel was sanctioned under Minnesota Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, which reads congruently with Federal Rule 11, in the
amount of approximately $130,000. The supreme court reversed, primarily on grounds of fairness, but also suggesting that a case could not
logically reach trial and be so worthy of sanctions. 95
As previously noted, courts have widely held that a claim's dismissal
does not prove a Rule 11 violation.9 6 For example, in Harrison v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc,
the court granted summary judgment against
plaintiff on a number of securities claims because it found plaintiff's evidence "too thin to allow a jury to find in favor of plaintiffs on necessary
factual issues." 98 However, the court properly denied Rule 11 sanctions
92. Id. at 1189.

93. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Kimbrough Inv. Co., 703 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir. 1983) (prevailing Title VII defendant denied counsel fees after bench trial of claim); Jones v. Texas
Tech Univ., 656 F.2d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) ("the fact that a plaintiff's claim received careful consideration by the district court may properly be taken into account in
determining whether the claim was frivolous"); accord Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co. 870
F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir. 1989) (sanctions denied for pressing discrimination claims that
survived summary judgment despite subsequent voluntary dismissal by plaintiff), remanded and vacatedon other grounds, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Nelken, Chan-

cellor,supra note 15, at 391 ("It is both inefficient and fundamentally unfair... to impose
Rule 11 sanctions" where a party "has survived a summary judgment motion.");
Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 16, at 1019 (favorably citing Oliveri v. Thompson, 803
F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987) for taking this view and
criticizing Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) for
failing to appreciate relation between Rule 11 and summary judgment).
94. 464 N.W.2d 130, 144 (Minn. 1990) ("A party who survives these [summary judgment] motions with the major claims intact should not be subject to sanctions after trial
predicated on these surviving claims."); see infra text accompanying note 117.
95. See Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144.
96. SeeABA Standards,supra note 19, at 118-19; see, eg., Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l.
Co., 870 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir. 1989) (sanctions denied where plaintiff's attorney failed
to withdraw claim based on papers that had previously survived a summary judgment
motion), remanded and vacated on other grounds, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989); Oliveri v.

Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986) (Rule II sanctions reversed against civil
rights attorney who withdrew claims against police; court found discovery necessary to
show absence of meritorious claim), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
97. 132 F.R.D. 184 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
98. Harrison,132 F.R.D. at 188. The court explained that "[p]laintiffs did not fail to
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because it viewed the plaintiff's supporting evidence as merely weak
rather than nonexistent.9 9 The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules
appears to take this view as well. In the draft Committee Note accompanying a proposed revision of Rule 11, the Committee noted that if "summary judgment is rendered against a party [this] does not necessarily
mean... that it had no evidentiary support for its position. On the other
hand, if a party has sufficient evidence with respect to a contention that
would suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment based thereon, it
would have had sufficient 'evidentiary support' for purposes of Rule
11.1oo
On the other side of the coin, however, even courts sensitive to the
pitfalls of Rule 11 do not always seem to appreciate that a summary
judgment denial limits the likelihood that a sanctioned claim lacks adequate grounding in fact.101
offer any evidence in support of the factual issues determined adversely to them, but
failed to overcome the overwhelming weight of the evidence against their arguments." Id.
(emphasis in original).
99. See id. at 187-88. The court also saw the ultimate merits of the case as considerably less germane to the Rule 11 inquiry than a focus upon "whether plaintiffs and their
attorneys undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and applicable law before filing."
Id. at 187.
Harrisonprovides another example of the greater leeway courts seem to accord sophisticated commercial defendants in litigation. According to the court, "Dean Witter seems
to argue that, in light of the summary judgment ruling, it is obvious plaintiffs failed to
meet the Rule 11 requirements of reasonable inquiry." Id. at 187. If the court's assessment is accurate and flows directly from Dean Witter's arguments, the brokerage house's
position was a manifestly incorrect statement of the law. Although Dean Witter could
safely argue that the law should be modified to slant in an even more pro-defendant
direction, it apparently did not identify its argument as sounding in law reform.
Further, Dean Witter's argument, as characterized by the court, suggests a virtual per
se requirement of Rule 11 liability for losers of pretrial dismissal motions, a position
rejected by most courts and commentators, see supra note 89 and accompanying text,
thus making it hard to cast defendant's Rule 11 argument as one offered in good faith and
free of an improper purpose such as harassing the plaintiff. Under these circumstances,
one could make a compelling case that it is the defendant rather than the plaintiffs who
should be sanctioned. However, the court not only showed no such inclination but devoted considerable detail to rejecting Dean Witter's weak argument for Rule 11
sanctions.
100. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial. Conference of the
United States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence 6 (August 1991) (copies on file with author). Draft Rule 11
would substitute the term "evidentiary support" for the words "well grounded in fact"
under current Rule 11. The proposed amendments, if adopted, would make extensive
changes in Rule 11 and other rules, principally those governing discovery. As of this
writing, the proposal remains open for public comment and can not displace the current
rules until at least late 1992 and, more realistically, until late 1993. More extensive commentary on proposed amended Rule 11 obviously is beyond the scope of this article.
101. See Healey v. Chelsea Resources, 133 F.R.D. 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In Healey the court wrote:
The court's denial of summary judgment in no way establishes that this suit
had any basis in fact. On the summary judgment motion, the court had before
it only those facts and allegations that the parties chose to present in their affidavits. The court's denial of the motion does not undercut the court's conclu-
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Perhaps the most succinctly blunt misanalysis of the relation between
summary judgment and Rule 11 is found in Lemaster v. United States.12
Lemaster involved plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Lemaster and their 18-yearold son, Stephen. The IRS pursued the Lemasters for having fraudulently transferred assets, primarily the family trucking company, to Stephen in order to dodge income tax liability. After its investigations, the
IRS concluded that the son and parents were alter egos and seized the
family assets. Magically, Mr. Lemaster opened10his
wallet and paid the
3
past due taxes to obtain release of the property.
Not willing to let poor enough alone, the Lemasters then sued the government pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7426, contending that the IRS had
wrongfully seized property legitimately belonging to their son. Despite
the thin veneer covering the Lemaster's misconduct, the trial court denied the government's motion to dismiss the son's claims, although it
granted summary judgment as to the parents' claims. The trial court
stated that a material issue of fact existed regarding whether the son was
the owner of the property or merely the instrumentality of his father.104
Not surprisingly, the district court, after a two-day bench trial, found the
issue substantially clearer and entered judgment for the government, also
awarding Rule 11 sanctions totalling nearly $20,000 (approximately
$5,000 against
counsel and $15,000 jointly and severally against the
05
Lemasters).1
In affirming the sanctions award, the Sixth Circuit concluded "that
there is no reasonable way the Lemasters or [counsel] could have
doubted that James [the father] was the true owner of all contested assets.'""°6 Of course, if no reasonable fact finder could have failed to find a
sham transaction and all relevant facts were before the court prior to
trial, one tends to think that summary judgment should have been
granted. Only judicial error, poor lawyering by defendants, misconduct
by plaintiffs, or a matter hinging on credibility coupled perhaps with misconduct by plaintiffs can explain a denial of summary judgment if the
sion that facts in [the plaintiff's attorney's] possession, which first became
apparent to the court at trial, made clear that the suit had no reasonable factual

basis.

id.
Judge Robert L. Carter, who has been outspoken in his concern that Rule 11 not chill
vigorous advocacy, especially in civil rights claims, decided Healey. For a discussion of
Judge Carter's view of Rule 11, see generally Carter, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure
as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2179 (1989). The first half of this
quotation suggests rejection of this article's approach. However, the last sentence and the
context of the case suggest that in Healey, Judge Carter implicitly concluded that counsel's conduct was sufficiently egregious to overcome this article's proposed presumption
against sanctions where summary judgment is denied.
102. 891 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1989).
103. See Lemaster, 891 F.2d at 116-18 for more details of the Lemaster saga.
104. See id. at 117-18.
105. See id. at 118. The trial court concluded that the son's alleged ownership of the
trucking business and other property was a "sham."
106. Id. at 119.
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Sixth Circuit's characterization of the evidence is correct. The latter two
events may justify sanctions. The former two explanations probably
should not.
The Lemasters did argue that they were immune from sanctions due to
the trial court's denial of summary judgment, an argument the appellate
court rejected 0 7 citing cases that rejected the argument' 0 8 and quoting
noted Rule 11 authority, Gregory Joseph, Esq., who wrote:
The mere fact that a judge declines to dismiss an action or grant summary judgment on procedural grounds, or allows an issue to go to the
jury for purposes of administrative convenience, does not preclude the
imposition of sanctions or even constitute evidence that sanctions
should not be granted. 109
Despite Mr. Joseph's deserved status as a Rule 11 authority, the
quoted statement is overbroad and promotes a flawed and excessively
harsh view of Rule I l's relation to pre-trial practice, especially as read by
the Lemaster court. In addition, one must appreciate the ambiguity in
the statement. A denial of summary judgment on "procedural grounds"
can be read as meaning the denial of summary judgment on a technicality-for example to accommodate plaintiff's request for discovery or because an affidavit was not notarized, thus preventing the denial from
being a serious examination of the merits of the case. Of course, where
denial on procedural grounds occurs because of misconduct by the nonmovant, sanctions may be apt. 0 By contrast, denial of summary judgment on an acceptably developed record with no intervening factual revelations before or at trial could be viewed as denial of summary judgment
on substantive rather than procedural grounds.
At a minimum, denial of summary judgment must be at least some
evidence of a nonsanctionable paper unless the party resisting summary
judgment has deceived the court or the party moving for summary judgment has made the motion so close to trial as to trigger the administrative convenience concerns mentioned in the Joseph excerpt. In addition,
the Lemaster court wrenches the quote out of context from Section 11 (F)
of the Joseph treatise, which states as a black letter proposition that
"[t]he fact that a judge has considered and accepted a legal argument is
107. See Lemaster, 891 F.2d at 121.
108. The cases cited were Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S.
120 (1989) and Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 796 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1986). As discussed infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text, Pavelic & LeFlore and Barrios, like
Lemaster, are perfectly consistent with this article's suggested approach when analyzed
correctly because in all cases the sanctioned parties appear to have avoided summary
judgment through misconduct rather than judicial error.
109. Lemaster, 891 F.2d at 121 (quoting G. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of
Litigation Abuse 169 (1989)).
110. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 937-39 (2d Cir. 1989) (Rule
11 sanctions imposed; attorney criticized for discovery abuse and lack of candor), remanded and vacated on other grounds, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989).
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evidence that the argument is non-frivolous."' I Joseph would go even
further than this article suggests by giving substantial weight to dissenting and concurring opinions expressing minority views in support of a
rejected "'warranted by existing law'" or law reform argument under

Rule

11.112

More to the point, Joseph states on the same page cited by Lemaster
1 3
that "the fact that a case gets to trial is some measure of its merit.,,"
Whether one criticizes Joseph for ambiguity or the Lemaster court for
superficial analysis, the result is the same: neither persuasively demonstrates a lack of relationship between pre-verdict disposition devices and
Rule 11.114 As the preceding discussion shows, the two are inevitably

logically linked.
II.

REDUCING ASYMMETRY AND SHARPENING JUDICIAL Focus
THROUGH A PRESUMPTION AGAINST RULE 11 SANCTIONS

A.

The Logic of the Presumption

I propose a common law codification of what the better-reasoned decisions do implicitly. The suggested rule, by elevating a claim's pretrial
survival to a presumption against sanctions and a "semi-safe" harbor,
goes somewhat beyond the ad hoc approach of Sullivan v. School Board

of Pinellas County"' and other better-reasoned cases'

6

that treat the

pretrial proceedings merely as a factor to consider in Rule 11 decisions.
This more structured approach of the per se presumption builds upon the

approach taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Uselman v.

Uselman.I17 It better serves the purposes of both the civil rights laws and
judicial efficiency by more closely cabining district court discretion and
by reducing the temptation for a trial court to punish lawyers or litigants
111. See G. Joseph, supra note 108, at 167.
112. Id. at 167-68.
113. Id. at 169-70 (citing National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. National Fed'n of

Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1988) and Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note

16, at 1019). Like the Lemaster court, attorney Joseph cited Barrios v. Pelham Marine,
Inc., 796 F.2d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1986), but noted that sanctions were deemed apt in that
case because the unsuccessful summary judgment motion came on the eve of trial.
114. Where other cases have stated that a claim's survival to trial provides no protection against sanctions, they have applied law other than Rule 1I and often dealt with
claimant conduct that appears to satisfy this article's suggested "fraud, misrepresentation, or other egregious misconduct" exception to the proposed presumption against
sanctions after denial of a pre-verdict dismissal motion. See, eg., Greenberg v. Hilton
Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 937-40 (2d Cir. 1989) (awarding attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) due to counsel's discovery abuse and lack of candor with the trial court),
remanded and vacated on other grounds, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989); Zissu v. Bear,

Stearns & Co., 805 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1986) (awarding defense fees pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 77k(e) against securities fraud claimant who appears to have kept litigation alive
through bad faith prosecution).
115. 773 F.2d 1182 (11th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
116. See cases cited supra note 93.
117. 464 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1990); see also supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text
(discussing case).
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it comes to find irritating. It would also restore some of the symmetry
that has been lost during the 1980s as various changes in the rules, the
composition of the bench, and precedent have tilted the pre-existing balance of litigation force to the advantage of defendants.
Commentators and bar associations have also touched upon the issue
without clearly establishing an approach to the interrelation of Rule 11
and pretrial dismissal. An exception is the recent report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,"" that suggested the approach
taken in this article" 9 and stated that the presumption against sanctions
should be rebutted only if the district court finds the party targeted by a
sanctions motion to have avoided dismissal through "a knowing or reckless misrepresentation that was a proximate cause of the court's denial"

of the dismissal motion. 120

This article's proposed presumption also holds some potential for improving judicial decisions and litigant behavior. Although I, along with
others, have criticized the Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy for imposing logistical burdens on claimants and for tempting too
many judges to act as pretrial fact finders, 12 1 the new Rule 56 jurisprudence is, even in my view, not an entirely bad thing. The 1986 trilogy
was intended to prompt courts to take a long, hard look at cases prior to
trial. Regardless of one's views of the trilogy, no one can dispute that the
judicial system is better served by a searching review of summary judgment motions rather than the twin extremes of perfunctory denial or
fact-finding subterfuge directed toward a disliked case, claim, or counsel.
If judges viewing weak cases appreciate that a perfunctory denial largely
immunizes the non-movant and counsel from Rule 11 sanctions or fee
shifting, the court will look longer and harder at the matter.
Similarly, the anti-sanctions presumption should drive defense lawyers
either to refrain from dismissal motions or to pursue them with greater
vigor and professionalism.' 22 For example, in the unreported case of
Elona v. Frederick,123 the defendant's initial summary judgment motion
and the two following motions amounted to little more than an assertion
that plaintiff's claim lacked merit. Only six weeks before trial did defendant finally present the court with a motion satisfying the concerns of
Justice White's Celotex concurrence 124 and a reasonable lawyer's notion
118. See New York Bar Report, supra note 10.
119. See id. at 286. I am perhaps particularly fond of the Association's view because I
was a member of the Federal Courts Committee that drafted the Comments.
120. New York Bar Report, supra note 10, at 286 n.38.
121. See Stempel, supra note 80, at 159-81.
122. Cf Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986) ("it would be inequitable to permit a defendant to increase the amount of attorneys' fees recoverable as a
sanction by unnecessarily defending against frivolous claims"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918
(1987).
123. See Elona v. Frederick, No. 90-4154 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (decision pending as of this
writing). I assisted the Center for Constitutional Rights in submitting an amicus brief in
support of the sanctioned lawyer in Elona.
124. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (White, J., concurring).
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of well-done
summary judgment papers. Further, in Chemiakin v.
YefiMov, 1 25 defense counsel either failed to note the absence of subject
matter jurisdiction apparent on the face of plaintiff's complaint or failed
to advise the court of its lack of jurisdiction. Because Rule 11 applies to
all papers filed with the court, not just complaints, defense counsel in
these cases could be viewed as culpable, but only plaintiffs were
sanctioned.
In any event, defendants have not been deterred from substandard
lawyering to the extent that plaintiffs have been affected. The "refrain or
do it right" incentive of this article's approach would begin to redress
this imbalance but should not unduly restrict the ability of defense lawyers and judges to deter frivolous litigation. Even in cases where complete summary judgment is obviously inappropriate, Rule 11 permits the
sanctioning of particular claims, statements, and arguments even though
other aspects of the case as a whole have merit.126
Although the anti-sanctions presumption may, ironically, lead to some
increase in summary judgment, the summary judgments granted should
be those in which most observers (and reviewing courts) see dismissal as
apt. Even if the dismissal is controversial or erroneous, the issue in question is isolated for examination on appeal. Although the appellate burden on losing claimants should not be underestimated, this burden
carries with it the benefits of earlier review. If the claim is considered
sufficiently weak and subject to dismissal by the circuit court as well,
plaintiff's resources are probably best invested in something other than
the claim at issue. Where summary judgment is reversed, plaintiff not
only gets virtual sanctions immunity but also the opportunity to try the
case before a properly re-educated trial court. 2 7 To best realize the gains
of the anti-sanctions presumption and to minimize the pro-defendant aspects of the 1986 trilogy, courts should liberally utilize Federal Rule
54(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the collateral order doctrine to accord
earlier review of orders granting partial summary judgment.'
125. 932 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991).
126. See, e.g., Burull v. First Nat'l Bank, 831 F.2d 788, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1987),
(groundless claim sanctioned), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); Kramer, Levin, Nessen,
Kamin & Frankel v. Aronoff, 638 F. Supp. 714, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (sanctioning
groundless affirmative defenses and counterclaims); accord ABA Standards, supra note
19, at 119.
127. Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't., 888 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1989) provides an
illustration. Despite the trial judge's obvious hostility toward the claim and disbelief of
the plaintiff reflected in his grant of summary judgment to defendants, plaintiff on remand presented the case to a jury before the same judge and obtained a verdict in excess
of $250,000.
128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to enter separate final judgments to permit
separate appeals prior to final disposition of the entire case; 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) permits a
trial court to certify for immediate appeal an otherwise interlocutory order that presents
a controlling question of law whose earlier resolution will advance final disposition of the
case. See Herr, supra note 28, § 25.9; Wright & Miller, supra note 6, §§ 3920-3921. The
collateral order doctrine permits interlocutory review of an order that completely resolves
a disputed issue separate from the merits of the litigation where appeal after final judg-
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At a minimum, the denial of a dismissal motion should operate to limit
any sanction of defense counsel fees or costs to those expenses actually
incurred through the making of the first motion that could have terminated the case. Imposition of Rule 11 sanctions after trial holds perhaps
even more chilling impact than hyper-aggressive, erroneous pretrial sanctions awards. Even the worst pretrial Rule 11 decisions have a more
limited impact on the parties and counsel than do post-trial awards.
When counsel fees are used as the yardstick for Rule 11 sanctions and
the court grants a dismissal motion, large fee awards are unlikely to occur. However, where the court, with little or no warning, imposes Rule
11 sanctions at the end of the litigation under the theory that a plaintiff's
claim was flawed at the inception, the potential sanction can become
enormous, effectively converting federal courts from the traditional
American Rule to the English Rule regarding counsel fees.
The judiciary usually refrains from adopting broad or absolute rules
and this is generally a good tendency. However, judicial reluctance to
limit Rule 11 seems occasionally to stem both from judicial overestimation of the bad effects produced by rules restricting sanctions discretion
and from lawyers arguing for protections that are too broad. For example, in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.,' 2 9 the court sensibly
adopted the majority rule noted above: particular statements are sanctionable even if the paper as a whole possesses merit. In doing so, however, the Ninth Circuit seemed unduly cynical about the legal profession,
stating:
It would ill serve the purpose of deterrence to allow, as does Murphy, a
"safe harbor" for improper or unwarranted allegations. Under Murphy, a party that has one non-frivolous claim may pile on frivolous
allegations without a significant fear of sanctions.... a party with one
non-frivolous claim frivolously
could add defendants without a signifi130
cant fear of sanctions.
Townsend speaks as if lawyers are inexorably driven to make hokey
claims and arguments despite the prevailing conventional wisdom that
lawyers only hurt strong arguments by diluting them with weak arguments."' In addition, the court envisions, presumably because counsel
sought it, an excessively safe harbor. Any protective rule can become an
ment effectively denies a litigant meaningful review. Because of the "separate" requirement of the doctrine, it will have impact in only a few of the summary judgment cases
addressed in this article but will have importance with certain relatively pure issues of
law such as qualified immunity of government officials.
129. 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
130. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1363; see also 929 F.2d at 1367-68 (Canby and Pregerson,
JJ., concurring) (contending that majority unnecessarily overruled Murphy and that instant case was apt for sanctions because all claims against particular party were
frivolous).
131. See, e.g., Herr, supra note 28, §§ 3.1-6.11 (weak motions and arguments are strategically unwise as well as potentially unethical); T. Mauet, Fundamentals Of Trial Techniques (2d ed. 1988) (at trial, litigator should focus on strongest arguments to exclusion
of weak arguments; favoring fewer rather than more arguments and theories of case).
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invitation to abuse if it is overly protective or devoid of reasonable exceptions. For example, the argument rejected in Townsend-an absolute
safe harbor so long as there exists one nonfrivolous claim against one
defendant in a multiclaim, multidefendant case-proves too much.
However, courts have, in determining the apt sanction, applied a general
"standard" (as opposed to a rule) of assessing frivolous aspects of a case
in the context of the merit of the litigation as a whole and the context of
the dispute as a whole.' 3 2 For reasons discussed earlier, this article advocates an anti-sanctions presumption that functions more as a rule, but a
flexible rule subject to narrowly confined but important exceptions. Consequently, this rule provides a safe harbor but not an impregnable
fortress.
Although a large number of Rule 11 or other sanctions are imposed
due to claims or assertions that are eliminated well before trial,' adoption of the presumptive safe harbor would provide valuable protection to
litigants in close cases or where litigation becomes protracted. It would
also tend to promote economy of legal resources by establishing some

fairly clear limitations upon the potential for Rule 11 "satellite
litigation."
For example, in Uselman v. Uselman,3 4 the anti-sanctions presumption would have been triggered by the repeated (five times) denial of summary judgment on the merits. 35 Consequently, the trial court would
have been permitted to sanction counsel only if her misconduct had
132. See ABA Standards,supra note 19, at 125-26.

133. See e.g., Fox v. Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1991)
(sanctions imposed for securities law claims dismissed prior to settlement of remainder of
case); Val-Land Farms v. Third Nat'l Bank, 937 F.2d 1110, 1111, 1117-18 (6th Cir. 1991)
(sanctions imposed for statutory claim dismissed upon Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Quiroga v.
Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 499, 505 (3d Cir. 1991) (sanctions imposed after grant of
summary judgment against employee's claim of contractual employment).
Of course, even where a claim is eliminated by Rule 12 or summary judgment, the
sanctioned party may have something well worth arguing over. For example, plaintiff
Quiroga asserted that he was covered by the Hasbro employees' manual and that statements in the manual created contract rights. Defendant Hasbro averred by affidavit that
the manual did not apply to managerial employees. Quiroga responded that he was never
told of this. The district and circuit courts found Quiroga to have thus presented "no
evidence" in opposition to the summary judgment motion, entered partial summary judgment, and also concluded that Quiroga's employment contract claim was not well
grounded in fact and thus was subject to Rule I1 sanctions. The Quiroga result seems
unduly severe: Quiroga was an employee; his assertion of rights stemming from an employment manual would thus not seem frivolous absent a written disclaimer on the manual or conclusive proof that he was told of the managerial exception; Hasbro had neither.
See also Thompson v. Duke, 940 F.2d 192, 197-98 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding trial court
grant of summary judgment in civil rights claims but reversing Rule 11 sanctions because
adverse controlling precedent was sufficiently distinguishable to make case non-frivolous); Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbecue Corp., 932 F.2d 697, 699-700 (8th Cir. 1991) (Rule
11 sanctions imposed after dismissal of complaint for failure to serve within 120-day limit
on theory that unserved complaint did unfair damage to defendant's reputation).
134. 464 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1990); see also supra notes 94-95, 116 and accompanying
text (discussing Uselrnan).
135. See id. at 136.
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aided the case's survival. The facts of the case as reported could not
support such a finding and the sanctions matter would have ended. Instead, the trial court plunged into the more difficult question of whether
the plaintiff's claims were not only unsuccessful but so bad as to be frivolous, an inquiry in which the trial court erred, wasting its own time and
the time of the unanimous state supreme court that reversed the sanctions order, as well as placing a metaphorical $190,000 Sword of Damocles above the plaintiff's counsel. 136
Although Greenberg v. Hilton InternationalCo. 137 correctly decided
that pursuit of Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims did not warrant sanctions, this result would have been obtained more easily through application of the presumptive safe harbor. In Greenberg, the court denied
defendant Hilton's summary judgment motion on the claims. 138 Thereafter, plaintiff and her counsel pursued extensive discovery attempting to
establish a pattern of disparate treatment based on gender. 139 The discovery proceedings ultimately resulted in plaintiff's counsel being sanctioned, essentially for having misrepresented her intentions regarding the
information sought." 4 As to the soundness of the claims themselves,
however, the district court and the Second Circuit both found that the
litigation was not frivolous in view of the information available to plaintiff and counsel at the time of filing. Invoking the presumptive safe harbor, the appellate court could have streamlined its affirmance on this
point considerably yet retained its authority to impose sanctions for the
papers filed in connection with the discovery battle due to the misconduct of plaintiff's counsel.
In Chapman & Cole v. Itel ContainerInternationalB. V, 4 the court
imposed sanctions after a seven-day bench trial. Prior to trial, plaintiff
had sought dismissal and summary judgment, which the court denied. 142
After trial, the court apparently determined that defendants had unfairly
kept the case alive, primarily with assertions made at two pretrial conferences. 143 The opinion is unclear as to whether defendants made untrue
or unfounded assertions in affidavits or other summary judgment papers.
If the Itel trial court had been operating under this article's proposed
regime, it would have been required to give the pretrial dismissal motions
more scrutiny than it apparently gave, but would, absent proof of misconduct, been forced to forgo Rule 11 sanctions if the matter went to
trial.
136. See id. at 140.
137. 870 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1989).
138. See id. at 930.
139. See id. at 930-32.
140. Plaintiff's counsel had asserted that she would retain expert witnesses for sophisticated statistical analysis of the data but later was discovered to have made no such
arrangements. See id. at 938-39.
141. 116 F.R.D. 550 (S. D. Tex. 1987).
142. See id. at 552-53.
143. See id. at 553.
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Either way, the system would have benefitted through avoidance of the
seven-day bench trial or through avoidance of the extensive post-trial
sanctions proceedings, which included the court's "show cause" hearing
on sanctions and written opinion. For example, the court made a posttrial inquiry into the offending attorney's investigation of the claim, including in camera review of a tape of a telephone conversation between
client and counsel and concluded that counsel should have realized that
her client's statements were "based on nothing more than sheer speculation" and "had little, if any substantive value." 1" Putting aside the
court's seeming internal contradiction (presumably, "sheer speculation"
has no substantive value), the fact remains that the court could have
brought such issues into sharp relief through a well-administered summary judgment hearing and decision. The court failed in this task.
Whether, under these circumstances, counsel's continued forging ahead
was frivolous conduct or zealous representation becomes a perhaps uncomfortably close question. These sorts of difficult questions are better
decided on the merits through Rule 56 scrutiny. When the case survives
summary judgment, post hoc Rule 11 inquiry most often only squanders
time, nerves, judicial resources, and the funds, reputations, and client
relations of counsel.
B. Exceptions to the Presumption
Notwithstanding the compelling logical linkage between Rule 11, Rule
12(b)(6), Rule 50(a), and Rule 56, I do not advocate a presumption
against sanctions that is absolute or irrebuttable. Making this article's
proposed "safe harbor" impregnable poses too much potential for encouraging litigants to stretch the facts unreasonably, to fabricate facts, or
to engage in other serious misconduct (for example, discovery abuse such
as stonewalling or seeking excessive discovery to postpone or defeat dismissal, urging witnesses to be unavailable or to give ambiguous or contradictory testimony).14 Litigants and lawyers must be subject to
sanctions where sufficiently improper conduct occurs. The suggested approach takes this policy goal into account. Although courts seldom give
the matter extended discussion, case law suggests that many courts have
implicitly applied the exception and grasped its rationale in cases where
sanctions have been levied despite a claimant's having survived a dismissal motion.
For example, in Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,'4 6
144. Id. at 555.

145. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1991).
The Townsend court criticized Rule 11 safe harbors as compromising too greatly the
deterrent purpose of the rule and leading to strategically abusive conduct. In my view the
Townsend concern is overdone, at least rhetorically. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. But in any event, I do not regard the Townsend criticism as debilitating to
my proposed safe harbor, which becomes unsafe if the Rule 11 target has engaged in
fraud or other egregious misconduct.
146. 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
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plaintiff in the main action survived summary judgment by contending
that its signature on a contract was forged or made without authorization
by his attorney-in-fact. Ultimately, the district court, sustained by the
Second Circuit, found the forgery claim to lack merit.147 Although both
the district and appellate courts stopped short of labeling plaintiff's affidavit, which alleged forgery, an outright fraud, the aroma of misrepresentation surrounded the decision to permit imposition of Rule 11
sanctions after trial of a claim that survived summary judgment. Implicitly, the lower courts took the view that this was not unjust since plaintiff's own affirmative but untrue representations resulted in the
continuation of the litigation. The Supreme Court ultimately did not disturb that assessment, but limited the reach of the sanction by holding
that Rule 11 did not impose vicarious liability on the law partner of the
attorney who signed the offending pleading. 14
A more egregious situation produced post-trial Rule 11 sanctions in
Lockette v. American Broadcasting Co. 4 9 Title VII plaintiff Lockette
secretly tape recorded conversations with his co-workers. When defendant moved for summary judgment, Lockette submitted an affidavit asserting facts related to at least one of the taped conversations but did not
disclose the existence of the tapes. When the tapes subsequently surfaced
at trial, they clearly contradicted Lockette's affidavit. The court, in the
midst of a bench trial, concluded that Lockette had misrepresented the
now-undisputed content of the conversation and that this misrepresenta-

tion had resulted in the denial of the earlier summary judgment motion.
Under these circumstances, the court found Rule 11 50sanctions apt

notwithstanding its earlier denial of summary judgment.'

In Avirgan v. Hull,'5 ' the now-famous lawsuit brought by the Christie
Institute against a number of defendants alleged to have engaged in crim147. See Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 111 F.R.D. 637, 643-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part sub nom. Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989). The district court found
that "it appears that in their ambition to maintain this action, Calloway and his counsel
allowed his inconclusive ability to recognize his signature to be translated into a conclusive denial of his signature." Calloway, 111 F.R.D at 647.
148. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126-27
(1989). In Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 133 F.R.D. 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the
court cited Calloway and Pavelic approvingly in implicitly endorsing this article's approach in imposing Rule 11 sanctions despite having previously denied summary judgment. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
149. 118 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
150. See Lockette, 118 F.R.D. at 91-92.
151. 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (1991). Because of the
subject matter of the lawsuit (U.S. policy in Central America during the 1980s) and the
large sanction (more than $1 million) imposed upon a public interest organization, Avirgan has received extensive press coverage and legal commentary. See, e.g., Note, A Prospective Capon Rule 11 Sanctions, 56 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1275, 1276 (1991) ("As a result of
...Avirgan v. Hull, the position of those critical of Rule 11 has been strengthened");
Defendants win Fees in Suit on Contra Aid, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1989, at B4, col. 3
(discussing possible chilling effect of Avirgan); Barringer, The Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,
1989, at A 1, col. 1 (reporting sanctions directed against plaintiffs).
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inal conspiracy in aid of the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, the district court
found that plaintiffs and counsel avoided summary judgment by using
detailed affidavits alleging specific facts, but that plaintiffs failed to produce any of this testimony or any related evidence at trial. The district
court, concluding that plaintiff's affidavits were designed to avoid summary judgment in the vain hope that favorable evidence would surface
during the pendency of trial, awarded defendants Rule 11 sanctions exceeding $1 million.' 5 2
Dayan v. McDonald's, Corp.,' 53 an Illinois case applying that state's
version of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the provision that authorizes sanctions
against vexatious attorney conduct, also fits this pattern. The court in
Dayan awarded more than $1.8 million dollars in fees to defendant based
on a finding that plaintiff, whose Parisian McDonald's franchises were
revoked for breach of contract, kept the lawsuit alive (and even obtained
a preliminary injunction) through fraudulent misrepresentations to the
court. In other cases, the misconduct of a party sanctioned after trial has
been less than fraudulent but still blameworthy in some aspect.15'
Cases like Pavelic & LeFlore, Lockette, Avirgan, and Dayan are quite
distinct from cases in which a claimant loses because the fact finder elects
to credit one side's testimony in the face of opposing testimony that can
not objectively be deemed so weak as to merit pretrial dismissal. Similarly, cases of the Pavelic/Lockette genre are very different from cases
based on circumstantial evidence where the factfinder is unwilling to
draw the inference requested by the claimant. In cases where a claimant
goes to trial and has claims rejected by the factfinder based on assessments of credibility (for example, what was really said at the contract
negotiation) or on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence (for
example, whether the sales managers of the three local widget makers
met to discuss price-fixing or a golf outing), a claimant's loss is only
that-a litigation disappointment. Even if the jury deliberates for only
three minutes before rendering a defense verdict, the claim does not
thereby become frivolous.
Of course, where dismissal was avoided by wrongdoing, post-trial
sanctions are in order and the presumption against sanctions has been
rebutted. Defining wrongdoing requires care but should not unduly increase the judicial burden. Fraud or misconduct of the sort that has traditionally satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) (permitting
152. See Avirgan, 705 F. Supp. at 1545-5 1.
153. 126 Ill. App. 3d 11, 466 N.E.2d 945 (1984).
154. See, eg., Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 796 F.2d 128, 130-33 (5th Cir. 1986)
(summary judgment motion made at the threshold of trial); Chapman & Cole v. Itel
Container Int'l, B.V., 116 F.R.D. 550, 552 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (last minute settlement to
avoid sanctions; court also implies misconduct and bad faith by sanctioned party, a defendant); Johnson v. New York City Transit Auth., 116 F.R.D. 394, 395-96 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd regardingsanctions but remandedfor reconsiderationof amount, 823 F.2d 31
(2d Cir. 1987) (repeated efforts by discrimination plaintiff to relitigate unsuccessful claims
in new forums).
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relief from judgment procured by fraud) would support Rule 11 sanctions even where dismissal was denied so long as the court made specific
findings supported by the record to conclude that the non-movant was
guilty of such misconduct. In addition, a claimant-non-movant's recklessness in averring ability to produce evidence at trial would also support a shifting of the presumption and an imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
in the appropriate case.1 55 Where, however, a claimant represents ability
to present evidence and is not at fault for inability to produce the promised evidence, Rule 11 sanctions should not be available even though the
matter appears in retrospect to have been apt for pretrial dismissal. For
example, where a witness not subject to subpoena power declines at the
last minute to voluntarily testify, sanctions would be inappropriate.
C. Allocating Error Costs
A more difficult question arises where a trial court's denial of a dismissal motion appears in error. Where a trial court refuses to dismiss a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 summary judgment because
it has miscalculated the potential probative value of the non-movant's
evidence or legal argument, or because the court failed to insist on the
rigorous analysis of the claimant's burden and proofs imposed in the
Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy, one can argue that a claim potentially violative of Rule 11 (or groundless within the meaning of Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1988) has "slipped through the cracks" of the federal judicial
system. 156 In my view, there are comparatively few cases where claims
and arguments bordering on the frivolous are not intercepted by pretrial
motion. Where this occurs, however, it constitutes an error cost that
must be internalized by the judicial system and defendants rather than by
claimants.
Just as dismissal does not indicate frivolousness, reversal of a refusal to
dismiss does not, standing alone, indicate that the earlier denial was sufficiently erroneous to make the ultimately defeated claim sanctionable.
Motions pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), 56, and 50(a) often present close
issues dividing bench, bar, and the academy.1 57 For example, in each of
the 1986 trilogy cases,' 58 the Supreme Court reversed respected circuit
155. See New York Bar Report, supra note 10, at 286.
156. Of course, the mere dismissal of a claim by pretrial motion does not indicate that

the claim violated Rule 11 or Section 1988. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980);
O'Neal v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 850 F.2d 653, 658 (1lth Cir. 1988).
157. The current furor over Rule 11 provides an example of considerable dispute
within the profession, which according to the comments received by the Advisory Committee in response to its Call for Comments divides quite sharply into Rule 11 supporters,
moderate critics of the current rule, and critics favoring a return to the pre-1983 Rule 11.
According to the comments and a survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center,
judges are most supportive of the current Rule 11, see T. Willging & E. Wiggins, supra
note 7, at Pt. IA, at 1, while practitioners are most hostile with most academics displaying strong criticism and proposing substantial amendment.
158. See supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
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court opinions denying summary judgment." 9 If anything, an appellate
court reversal of the denial of a dismissal motion or the district judge's
change of heart on the issue usually suggests that the issue was close.
If, however, the denial of summary judgment was in fact clear error resulting from misjudgment or insufficient scrutiny by the district court,
the hard question facing this article's approach devolves to who should
pay the costs of error.
The presumptive bar to sanctions, although imperfect, best serves the
long-term interests of all litigants and the judicial system. Although defendants in specific cases may claim that judicial error required them to
expend funds in needless defense, such defendants can articulate no persuasive reason why plaintiffs, particularly plaintiffs of modest means who
function virtually as congressionally deputized private attorneys general
under the Title VII and Section 1988 fee-shifting provisions, should underwrite errors of a trial court.
Jennings v. Joshua Independent School District'1 provides a good example of the problem. In Jennings, plaintiffs (a high school student and
her father as next friend) alleged that a high school's "dog sniffing" program aimed at drug contraband constituted an unconstitutional search.
Plaintiffs sued the school district, the superintendent, the vice principal, a
police officer, the city, and the dog handlers. The handlers and the
school district moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied "because no evidence had been submitted relating to the dog's reliability."16' 1 A five-day trial resulted, with the court directing a verdict at
the close of plaintiffs' case for all defendants except the police officer, for
whom the jury returned a verdict. The district court then imposed Rule
11 sanctions against plaintiff.
Although the trial judge apparently reasoned (at least prior to trial)
that a reliable dog is a constitutional dog, the Fifth Circuit saw it differently. Citing a seven-year-old precedent, it declared that "use of trained
dogs to sniff automobiles parked on public parking lots does not constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment."' 6 2 The appellate court also concluded that the police officer was entitled to
objective qualified immunity and that the trial regarding his subjective
good faith belief in the sniffer dog's accuracy and legality of the operation
159. On remand in Celotex, defendant's summary judgment motion was again denied
in an opinion by a divided panel. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33,
37-40 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). Tallying the views of judges
and justices favoring and opposing summary judgment in Celotex, Matsushita, and Liberty Lobby reveals 20 jurists favoring summary judgment in these three cases with 18
jurists opposed. Although one might technically label refusals to grant summary judgment "error" in light of the Court's ultimate criteria, it would be ludicrous to suggest that
a district judge denying summary judgment in any of the trilogy cases would have erroneously insulated the non-movant from Rule 11 sanctions if operating under this article's
proposed approach.
160. 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989).
161. Id at 315.
162. Id at 316.
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had been superfluous. 163 Thus, acting well after the fact, the court found
plaintiffs' claims to be frivolous and sanctionable to the tune of $84,000,
a figure that the Fifth Circuit found to require remand in light of
inter64
vening case law adopting the "least severe sanction" approach.'
The Jennings result is particularly pernicious in that it imposes potentially devastating sanctions against a civil rights plaintiff because a reviewing court ultimately decided that plaintiffs' claims were barred as a
matter of law165 even though the trial court permitted the case to extend
from pleading stage through discovery through trial to verdict and applied incorrect legal criteria for deciding defendants' dismissal motions.
Despite these judicial errors, the trial court later found the law so crystal
clear that it determined, again as an objective matter of law, that plaintiffs must have brought the suit for the improper purpose of harassment
(since plaintiffs presumably would know the law even if the district court
did not). One need not condone plaintiffs' handling of the case nor disagree with the Fifth Circuit's substantive legal viewpoints to appreciate
the trap cases like Jennings pose for plaintiffs. In a variant of the old,
bad joke ("first prize is a week in Philadelphia; second prize is two weeks
in Philadelphia"), plaintiff is permitted to go to trial, which serves only
to increase the amount of a post hoc sanction.
The need to avoid making plaintiffs insurers of pretrial dismissal decisions is even more compelling where the defendants are government entities or well-heeled commercial defendants 66 who can not only better
bear the risk of judicial error but who also are often the very entities
against which the judiciary should not wish to discourage civil rights
litigation. 167 The logic of the rules and statutes involved and the imperative of judicial restraint in applying sanctions and fee-shifting statutes
counsels strongly against any drift toward making sanctions doctrine a
fee-shifting mechanism for civil rights defendants.168 To prevent the
anti-sanctions presumption from encouraging defendants to forgo meritorious summary judgment motions, the presumption should not only
attach where summary judgment is denied but should ordinarily be established where the case proceeds to trial without a defendant seeking
pre-verdict termination.
163. See id. at 317.
164. Id. at 322.
165. See id. at 320. "Discovery brought forth no new evidence nor was there any basis
for expecting it to do so. Because the facts were known and virtually uncontested, the
question here for Rule 11 purposes must be whether Jennings' legal theories... could
fairly be said to have been unreasonable from the point of view both of existing law and
its possible extension, modification or reversal." Id. at 320.
166. Private defendants will almost always have commercial general liability insurance
that provides a defense to liability claims. In relatively constrained litigation, insurers
will bear the great bulk of defense costs.
167. This is particularly the case regarding Section 1988, which accompanies 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which was designed by Congress to provide private citizens with legal recourse in
federal court against local governments that violate civil rights.
168. See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (1lth Cir. 1987).
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The Special Circumstances of Civil Rights Claims

The value of the presumptive bar to sanctions outweighs its costs in all
suits but especially in civil rights actions. The overall tone of the Federal
Civil Rules for more than 50 years has been one encouraging access to
the federal courts. In passing the civil rights acts, the Congress of a century ago sought to empower litigants to take claims of civil rights violations to federal court without cowering in fear. The 1976 Congress
added strength to these laws when it enacted Section 1988.169 Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 both established the right to a remedy for
discrimination and provided incentive to plaintiffs through the pro-plaintiff fee-shifting provision upon which Section 1988 was modeled.
Although the drafters of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 certainly
intended to provide additional deterrence of frivolous litigation, they did
not intend that civil rights litigants be discouraged from vindicating the
substantive rights granted by Congress. Where a civil rights litigant survives dismissal motions but is ordered to reimburse defendants for even a
portion of the defendant's counsel fees, word travels fast among the relatively small plaintiff's civil rights bar. Subsequent civil rights plaintiffs
and counsel, especially those in the same locale, will hesitate to pursue
even meritorious and compelling claims where victory cannot be
guaranteed.
Absent this article's suggested safe harbor, the potential exists for what
began as a congressionally created one-sided English Rule for civil rights
plaintiffs to evolve (perhaps "regress" is a more apt term) into a judicially
created one-sided English Rule for defendants. Despite the care most
courts now seem to give Rule 11 matters in civil rights cases, 7 ' a relatively small number of poorly decided cases can have the substantial chilling effect feared by civil rights activists and Rule 11 opponents.
Although the "abuse of discretion" standard of review endorsed by the
Supreme Court17 1 has sufficient flexibility to provide a wealth of differing
levels of scrutiny,1 72 it is generally regarded as a deferential standard of
appellate review.' 73 The presumptive bar to sanctions helps provide the
necessary rigor to Rule 11 review by further defining the abuse of discretion standard, reducing the likelihood of extreme error, and limiting the
risk of extremely high fee-shifting sanctions and the most chilling sorts of
Rule 11 outcome. The presumptive sanctions bar approach also minimizes the need for the greater expenditure of judicial resources required
by highly case-specific adjudication by providing a ready yardstick that
both directs and simplifies the reviewing court's analysis.
Congress enacted the Attorney's Fees Civil Rights Act of 1976, now
169. See Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir. 1989), remanded
and vacated on other grounds, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989).
170. See Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated,supra note 50, at 110-16.
171. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2460-61 (1990).
172. See 1 S. Childress & M. Davis, Standards of Review § 4.21 (1986).
173. See id.

HeinOnline -- 60 Fordham L. Rev. 291 1991-1992

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to reduce perceived barriers to the prosecution of civil rights and citizen action suits. The 1976 Act was a legislative
overruling of the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society,'7 4 which had held that prevailing environmental protection plaintiffs were not entitled to fees from defendants under
the developing common law "private attorney general" exception to the
American Rule. The American Rule requires each litigant to bear its
own counsel fees but not ordinarily those of the opposing party. Congress correctly concluded that too many civil rights and public interest
litigants would be deterred from bringing even the most meritorious
claims because of their limited resources and because any damage award
resulting from successful litigation would be small in relation to the cost
of prosecuting the litigation. Section 1988 is patterned after Section
706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(k). The Supreme Court
has interpreted these counsel fees recovery
175
provisions congruently.
Section 1988 provides that in any action commenced under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, or 1986, the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee. Courts interpreting Section 1988 have noted that it is designed primarily for the benefit of plaintiffs-who will ordinarily be awarded fees unless special circumstances
make a fee award unjust-but that prevailing defendants may obtain a
fee award. However, because of the congressional intent underlying Section 1988 and its clear policy to encourage rather than discourage civil
rights claims, Section 1988 has not been interpreted as an English Rule
for defendants. Rather, defendants may obtain Section 1988 fees only
where a claim is "meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without
foundation."'' 76 Prevailing defendants may not obtain a fee award as a
matter of course but can receive counsel fees only "upon a finding that
the plaintiff's action
was frivolous, . . . even though not brought in sub17 7
jective bad faith."'
The leading Supreme Court decision regarding civil rights fee shifting
discussed the standard for defense counsel fees recovery in language that
buttresses arguments for this article's proposed presumptive bar to
sanctions:
In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist
the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action
must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of
174. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
175. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980); Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 420-22 (1978). ChristiansburgGarment, the earlier and more
expansive case involving Title VII, continues to be the leading case interpreting both
provisions. See Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14-16.
176. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14.
177. ChristiansburgGarment, 434 U.S. at 421.
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hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for
seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No mat-

ter how honest one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the outset,
the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not
emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the

midst of litigation. Even when the law or the facts appear questionable
or unfavorable at the outset,
a party may have an entirely reasonable
78
ground for bringing suit.1

Claims dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
are not automatically candidates for sanction because "[a]llegations that,
upon careful examination, prove legally insufficient to require a trial are
not, for that reason alone, 'groundless' or 'without foundation'" for purposes of Section 1988.179
Lower courts interpreting Section 1988 in the light of Supreme Court
precedent have largely hewed to this line, making defense fee awards a
rarity. 180 However, there are some divergent views on this point. For
example, the court in Greenberg v. Hilton International Co.' seemed
untroubled, at least in the abstract, by post-trial Section 1988 fee awards
for defendants, stating:
At the [trial] disposition stage, the strength or weakness of a case
may be viewed as a whole. That is not true when only a motion is
before the court. Cases that are ultimately viewed as frivolous may
well survive motions to dismiss under a system of notice pleading that
does not require factual detail and even motions for summary judgment in which the evidence may be presented
in sketchy fashion and
82
credibility may not be taken into account.'

Greenberg presents both the Rule 12(b)(6) and summary judgment
motions as excessively anemic. As a critic of the 1986 trilogy,18 3 I am
178. Id. at 421-22. The Court added that fees may be assessed against a plaintiff who
continues to litigate after a claim clearly became groundless. .See id. at 422.
179. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15-16.
180. See, eg., Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 913 F.2d 885, 895 (11th Cir.
1990) (prevailing § 1983 defendant not entitled to counsel fees), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
767 (1991); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., concurring) (concluding that prevailing Eleventh Circuit precedent forbids summary judgment in civil rights claims where circumstantial evidence supports conflicting inferences,
even where claimant's proof is seen as weak by the court); Unity Ventures v. County of
Lake, 894 F.2d 250, 254-55 (7th Cir. 1990) (losing § 1983 plaintiff cannot be held subject
to fees on the basis of adverse case law subsequent to its complaint); Sullivan v. School
Bd., 773 F.2d 1182, 1188-90 (11th Cir. 1985) (that discrimination claim required trial
weighs against award of fees to prevailing defendant); Summer v. Fuller, 718 F. Supp.
1523, 1525 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (plaintiff's claim must be patently frivolous to justify Section
1988 fees for defendant); Clay v. Harris, 583 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (section 1988 applicable to losing plaintiff only in unusual case).
181. 870 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), remandedand vacated on other grounds, 875 F.2d 39 (2d
Cir. 1989).
182. Greenberg, 870 F.2d at 940.
183. See Stempel, supra note 80, at 159-81.
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heartened by the Greenberg court's professed lackadaisical unwillingness
to grant summary judgment. It is not, however, an accurate appraisal of
the manner in which federal courts do their work: "sketchy" submissions in opposition to summary judgment are little protection to claimants. Where credibility contests drive the denial of pre-verdict dismissal
efforts, courts are generally wise to view different versions of reality as
resulting from honest disagreement rather than from factual frivolity or
misconduct. A jury's verdict or a judge's findings may be final, but, to
paraphrase Justice Jackson's quip about the Supreme Court, finality does
not equal infallibility.
As discussed above,' 8 4 both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions can be
extremely effective for providing a comprehensive overview of the respective legal and factual merits of a challenged claim, so long as counsel and
the parties play by the rules. Consequently, denial of a pre-verdict disposition and trial of civil rights claims should trigger the presumption
against sanctions, but the presumption can be overcome where claimants
and counsel have not played by the rules.
The arguments for the presumptive bar to Section 1988 and for Title
VII fee shifting where pretrial dismissal is denied parallel those of the
Rule 11 context but are stronger because of the civil rights claims being
made. These laws clearly reflect both enduring legislative sentiment' 8 5
and a higher order of law than that of the civil rules. The Rules Enabling
Act states that the civil rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right."1 8 6 As one professional group noted, "[o]ne can persuasively argue that a procedural rule, which under the Rules Enabling
Act becomes law through the inaction of Congress, should not so substantially change practice in an area of litigation (civil rights and discrimination cases) where Congress has affirmatively enacted a framework
favorable to these claims and the plaintiffs that bring them."' 8 7 However, this bar association, like the courts to date, declined to interpret
Section 1988/Title VII fee shifting as requiring claimant conduct worse
than that justifying Rule 11 sanctions. 8 Despite the tentative consensus
184. See supra notes 63-89 and accompanying text.
185. In both 1990 and 1991, Congress passed strong civil rights legislation in the tradition of Section 1988 and Title VII. President Bush, however, vetoed the 1990 legislation
and the attempt to override the veto fell two votes short in the U.S. Senate. See Stempel,
The Rehnquist Court,StatutoryInterpretation,InertialBurdens, and a Misleading Version
of Democracy, 22 U. Tol. L. Rev. 583, 585 (1991).

186. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).

187. New York Bar Report, supra note 10, at 281.
188. See Matthews v. Freedman, 882 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1989). However, the Advisory Committee, in its draft Committee Note to proposed amended Rule 11, states that
"In cases brought under statutes providing for fees to be awarded to prevailing parties,
the court should not employ cost-shifting under this rule in a manner that would be
inconsistent with the standards that govern the statutory award of fees." Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Federal Rules of Evidence 6 (August 1991) (copies on file with author). Presumably,
this means that Rule I1 sanctions should not be awarded in a Title VII or civil rights case
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that Rule 11 frivolousness should either be equated with Section 1988/
Title VII frivolousness or that Rule 11 constitutes an independent obligation of counsel beyond that of the civil rights fee-shifting statute, the
policy arguments supporting the presumptive bar to sanctions are
stronger in civil rights cases because of the broader purpose of those laws
and because these laws originated from "hands-on" congressional legislation rather than from congressional acquiescence to judicial rulemaking.
CONCLUSION

Rule 11 and its jurisprudence have proven problematic. Even proponents of the rule such as the Advisory Committee have acknowledged
this through the Call for Comments and through proposed amendment
of Rule 11.111 I have not attempted to offer a comprehensive blueprint
for amending Rule 11 11 but have instead suggested one discrete but valuable fine-tuning of sanctions practice under Rule 11 and fee-shifting
pursuant to Title VII and Section 1988.
Nonetheless, the presumptive protection suggested here can be imporwhere the court could not also award defense fees. Strict adoption of this view, which has
not been thoroughly thought through by either the bench or this author, could result in
situations in which a court refuses Rule 11 sanctions because a claim, although insufficiently grounded in fact, was not frivolous within the meaning of Christiansburg Garment In addition, ChristiansburgGarment and its progeny may require that courts view
civil rights cases as a whole for purposes of Rule 11 and preclude Rule 11 sanctioning of a
single defective claim in an otherwise nonfrivolous civil rights action.
189. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proposed
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (Aug. 1991 draft).
As of this writing, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Civil Procedure Rules and
the Standing Committee on Federal Practice and Procedure of the United States Judicial
Conference have issued a draft for new Rule 11 for formal public comment (previous
working drafts of the Advisory Committee have been widely circulated for informal comment). The comment period ends on February 1, 1992. A testimonial hearing is scheduled for November 21, 1991. After the public comment period, proposed amendments
may be reconsidered, revised, or dropped prior to submission to the Supreme Court for
transmittal to Congress, which then has 180 days to act before the proposed rules take
effect automatically. To quote the Beatles, rulemaking is a "long and winding road,"
although the profession differs on whether this is a good or bad trait. Compare Stempel,
supra note 80, at 181-92 (favoring various hurdles established by different levels of review
and broad interest group input) with Mullenix, supra note 36, at 797-805 (criticizing increasing politicization of rulemaking process, implying that the process's openness as well
as its checks and balances contribute to the problem).
190. Rule 11 scholarship abounds with more comprehensive proposals, including the
New York Bar Report, supra note 10, at 299-302, which proposes general omnibus sanctions rule directed toward abusive conduct and repeal of Rule 11 and other specific sanctions rules. In addition, the report favors that Rule 11, if retained, be amended to make
sanctions discretionary, to de-emphasize fee-shifting as a sanction, to de-emphasize focus
on the complaint, to focus on lawyer conduct rather than resulting product, to require a
hearing and specific fact-finding as prerequisite to sanction, to add vicarious liability for
law firms, and to specify that improper purpose alone justifies sanctions for filing even
legally meritorious paper. Other comprehensive proposals include: Cochran, Rule 11:
The Road to Amendment, 8 Fifth Cir. Rptr. 559, 573-75 (1991); Nelken, Chancellor,

supra note 15, at 385-90; G. Joseph, supra note 108, at 303-10; Burbank, supra note 15, at
1932-34, 1941-43, 1955-62; G. Vairo, supra note 1, at 19-23.
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tant. As one commentator noted, "equal justice will be possible under
Rule 11 only when federal judges subordinate their own normative preferences to the stated normative preferences of the Rule and of the
rulemakers."'I9 The constraints of the suggested approach would enhance neutrality in Rule 11 practice and militate against normative second-guessing.
Perhaps a further advantage of my proposal is that it does not require
amendment of the Civil Rules to take effect. Rather, it is required by a
proper reading of the Civil Rules.
191. See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1932-33.
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